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The spring  squall of  1991  about political  correctness  on  campus has
passed, leaving behind a muddy residue in the nation's political rhetoric. I
Although  the  squall  initially  may  have  seemed  to  develop  from  a
detached interest in campus developments,2  it rapidly became clear that
the campaign  against  "political  correctness"  was  this  year's version  of
conservative  concern  about  liberalism  in the  universities.3  The  timely
publication  of  Dinesh  D'Souza's  Illiberal Education, and  D'Souza's
understandable  efforts  to promote  the book's  sales  by publishing  op-ed
articles  and  appearing  on  news  programs,4  offered  a  continuing  news-
hook for  stories about political  correctness.  Conservatives  took up the
attack  on  political  correctness,  until  it  worked  its  way  into  President
Bush's commencement  speech at the University  of Michigan.5
Predictably,  the  conservative  appropriation  of the  attack on political
correctness  has obscured  more than it has clarified.  I intend  this essay
mostly to  lay out  precisely  what  ought to be at  issue.  Given  the con-
servative domination of the discourse,  much of what follows attempts to
show  how  overblown  or  distorted  the conservative  characterization  of
the issue is.  I draw upon my experience as an academic  in a law school,
and  therefore  focus on some  incidents in the  literature on political  cor-
*  I would like to thank Max Holland for his comments  on a very early version of this essay, and
Elizabeth  Alexander,  Mike Seidman,  and  Robin West for their comments  on later versions.
1.  I  asked  the Georgetown  University Law  Library  to monitor  articles  in  NEXIS on  political
correctness  from early  1991  to  the  present.  In  spring  1991  there  were  a  number of substantial
discussions; since then the search picks up an occasional editorial,  op-ed piece, or letter (along with
speeches  by the leadership  of the  People's Republic of China and their allies).
2.  For a relatively  early article representative  of this approach, see Adler et al,  Taking Offense,
NEWSWEEK,  Dec. 24,  1990, at 48.
3.  The prior  year's version  was  Allan  Bloom's  The Closing of the American Mind, which, as I
argue  below,  makes  what  is in  many  ways precisely the  opposite challenge  to what  it presents  as
liberal orthodoxy.
4.  I want to be clear that, although  I disagree with D'Souza, I find nothing objectionable in  his
efforts at self-promotion.  I know that it is difficult to make a living as a writer, and anyone trying to
do so is surely entitled  to try to  maximize  sales.
5.  William  Neikirk,  Bush on  Diversity: His Critics Fear a Harder Line on  Civil Rights, CHI.
TRIB.,  May  12,  1991,  at 4:1  (discussing  President  Bush's May 4 speech).
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rectness  that arose  in  law  schools,  although  I  will  also  bring  in  other
incidents  as appropriate.
The  first section of the essay shows  how little a casual reader of news
accounts  would  know  about  what  actually  has happened.  The  second
argues  that the attack on political  correctness  simply  overlooks  serious
issues  of pedagogy  when  it criticizes challenges to insensitive  classroom
presentations  as  "PC"  without  considering  whether  the  presentations
were  pedagogically  sound.  Because  the  language  of academic  freedom
and  free  speech  has been  tossed  around  in  these  discussions,  the third
section  tries  to  slice up the  problem to  see  exactly  where serious  ques-
tions of academic freedom might be raised; I argue that critics of political
correctness  have  actually  identified only a handful of such questions.
Despite the fact that the attack on political correctness has been wildly
overstated,  there may be a problem associated with political correctness,
defined  as  the  enforcement,  in  some  sense,  of politically-derived  stan-
dards  of scholarship.  The  final  section  attempts  to identify  what that
problem  is.  In brief, I argue that the fundamental  problem occurs when
academic administrators, lacking a vision of what a university should be,
bend to whatever wind happens to be blowing the strongest.  Under these
circumstances,  it seems likely that there has been little change recently in
the number of departures  from the vision of the university as the locale
for  disinterested  scholarly  inquiry,  although  perhaps  there  have  been
more  departures  leftward  than there  used to be.6  If we  really want to
make  universities  places  where  disinterested  scholarly  inquiry  occurs,
though, we have to look at administrators, not faculty or students.  Ironi-
cally,  the  attack  on  political  correctness  may  exacerbate  the  difficulty
because  academic  administrators  will  treat the  conservative  challengers
of "PC"  as just  another  interest group  to be  satisfied,  another wind  to
bend to.
I.  QUESTIONS  OF  EVIDENCE
The  ordinary  reader  of  newspapers  and  popular  magazines  has
received  a distorted  account of what has been  happening  on campuses.
One distortion, which I mention here only to relegate to footnotes hereaf-
ter, is that the rhetoric  about political  correctness is triggered  solely by
what are presented as efforts by liberals to "enforce"  their views against
conservatives.  There is, however, a parallel phenomenon of conservative
"enforcement"  against  liberals,  feminists,  and  others.  California  State
University  at Long Beach, for example, paid  $110,000  to settle a suit by
six former faculty members in the university's Women's  Studies program
who  alleged  that  "campus  administrators  joined  followers  of the  con-
servative activist Phyllis Schlafly in  1982 to 'purge'  the program of what
6.  Which  is not to  say that there have been fewer departures  rightward.
[VCol.  4:  127
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its critics  saw  as  'Marxist  and  lesbian indoctrination'  of students."7  In
the law schools, Richard Abel  offers an "incomplete  list"  of twelve peo-
ple associated with critical legal studies who "suffered  adverse personnel
decisions-denials  of tenure, contract terminations, and reversals of lat-
eral appointments  voted by  faculty."'  A  full consideration  of the prob-
lem  of political  correctness  ought  to  take  these  incidents,  and  other
similar ones, into account.
To avoid grievance collecting and a fruitless discussion of comparative
victimization, though, I will try to take the challenge to political correct-
ness on its own terms.  There is, however, yet another difficulty.  Pinning
down  the  evidence  of political  correctness  is  extraordinarily  difficult.
Reporting of incidents is woefully incomplete, at least  from the point of
view of one  familiar with how universities  operate.  The  accounts  have
gaps that a serious  reporter would have  tried to fill.
A.  Political  Correctness as an Urban Legend
Many of the stories about political correctness  resemble what folklor-
ists have called "urban  legends."  Undoubtedly something happened, but
the  newspaper reader would  be well-advised  to be cautious  about draw-
ing any conclusions  from the news accounts.  Drawing upon some addi-
tional library research  and my knowledge  of how universities  operate,  I
will  offer  alternative  accounts  of the  events,  consistent  with  what  has
been reported  and, in my judgment,  more likely to describe  what really
happened.
Journalism's  demands  provide  one  reason  for  the  inadequacy  of the
reporting.  Reporters want a "hot  lede,"  which  grabs the reader's  atten-
tion.  But, it is  hard to convey nuance  and detail  in  a  "hot  lede."  The
simplified  version  that the  reporter presents  then becomes the  basis for
the  event's  entry  into the  canon  of political  correctness  stories.9  Even
7.  Faculty Notes, CHRONICLE OF  HIGHER EDUCATION,  June  26,  1991,  at A12.  The University
did not admit wrongdoing,  and one might arguably treat the firings  as bending to the  wind in  1982
and  the  settlement  as  bending  to  the wind,  which  had  shifted  direction,  in  1991.  For another
example,  see Laura  A.  Kiernan,  Sturnick" Tough Enough to  Weather the Storm,  BOSTON  GLOBE,
May 26,  1991,  New  Hampshire Weekly,  at  1 (Republican Governor Gregg of New Hampshire  and
the  conservative  newspaper  demanded  firing  of  state  college  president  who  moved  religious
baccalaureate  ceremony  off  campus.)  After  Professor  Anita  Hill  testified  in  hearings  on  the
nomination of Clarence  Thomas to the Supreme Court,  a state legislator wrote the president of the
University  of  Oklahoma  that  "this  'Left-Wing  Extremist' "  should  be  fired.  Ways  &  Means,
CHRONICLE  OF  HIGHER  EDUCATION,  Oct.  23,  1991,  at  A23.  I  do  not  recall  seeing  the  term
"political  correctness"  being used  in connection  with that  letter.
8.  Richard  L.  Abel, Evaluating Evaluations: How Should Law Schools Judge Teaching?, 40  J.
LEGAL  EDUC.  407,  410 and  n.17 (1990).  Professor  Abel's thesis  is that these  personnel decisions
were based on these people's association  with critical legal studies.  The last category is particularly
important,  given  my  later  focus  on  the  case  of  Ian  Macneil,  where  D'Souza  takes  political
correctness  as  the reason  why Macneil's lateral  appointment was not taken up by  the Harvard  Law
School faculty.
9.  A very  nice, self-conscious  example of the use of a "hot  lede,"  precisely to make the point in
the  text,  is  Ken  Fireman,  'Political Correctness' In  Dispute,  NEWSDAY,  May  12,  1991,  at  34,
discussed  in  more detail below,  text accompanying  note  35.
1992]
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more  important,  virtually  everyone  who  has  participated  in  events
reported  the  next day  in the newspapers  knows that the  stories  almost
inevitably  get some of the more significant details wrong even when they
get the  basic  outlines of the story  right.  Where,  as  I argue  is  the case
with political  correctness,  the more  important phenomena  are  revealed
by the details rather than by the broad outlines, newspaper accounts will
fall short of what one needs  to understand the events.
Finally,  most  reporting on  political  correctness  has been  inadequate
even  by  ordinary journalistic  standards.  Stories rely  on accounts  pro-
vided by those who believe themselves victimized by political correctness,
and rarely acknowledge  that these sources have a variety of understanda-
ble biases that  a reader  ought to  take into  account.  When  the reports
draw on interviews  with those  on the other side of the controversy,  the
structure  of the  presentation-victim's  account,  taken  to  be presump-
tively correct,  followed by  opponent's account,  asserting that the events
were more complicated (and thereby not overcoming the presumption)--
leaves the victim's account  standing.
A good example  is an op-ed article published on July 29,  1991,  in the
Christian Science  Monitor,  a  reputable  newspaper  ordinarily  careful
about getting facts straight.  The article  is a skeptical look at the attack
on political correctness.  To establish that he takes  the attack seriously,
the  author  acknowledges  that  "there  have  been  cases  like  essayist
Edward  Hoagland  denied tenure at Bennington College because  he was
supposedly  homophobic  (which  he  does  not  seem  to  be)."'"  This  is  a
false statement  of fact.
On  June  15,  Hoagland  published  an  op-ed  article  in  the New  York
Times."  He reported  that the  English  department  at  Bennington  first
voted to renew  his contract  and then reversed that decision. 12  The first
thing to note is that Hoagland describes the department's initial decision
as one  to  "rehire"  him.  Hoagland,  like many  writers,  appears to have
had a renewable non-tenure track contract as something like a writer-in-
residence at Bennington,1 3  an arrangement that freed him from some of
10.  Keith C. Burris,  Conformity's Newest Guise, CHRISTIAN  SCIENCE  MONITOR,  July 29,  1991,
at  18.
11.  Edward  Hoagland, Fear  and Learning in Vermont, N.Y.  TIMEs,  June  15,  1991,  at A23.
12.  Hoagland  had  published  an  essay  in  Esquire magazine on  "the  current  literary  scene"  in
which he commented on  the AIDS epidemic,  saying that:
the disease had  spread  with faxlike speed  'because of a gale  of often  icy  promiscuity'  enjoyed
through an  orifice  animals had all but stopped using sexually when  the cloaca  was abandoned
70  million  to  100 million  years ago.  As a nature  writer, I  argued  that anal sex  is dangerous
because it's not provided for  physiologically,  not because  it is morally  wrong.
Id.  In my view,  it is not unreasonable to call this "homophobic,"  although I probably would not.  It
is, I  think, a clearly  callous way  of making a  point, and therefore  some evidence  of unfitness  for  a
candidate  for appointment to a faculty  at a college at  which some students  are homosexual.  For  a
more complete  discussion of the pedagogical  issues implicit  in the preceding  statement, see Part  II
infra.
13.  The entry  for  Hoagland  in  Who's  Who  is consistent with  this inference.  Its relevant  part
reads:  "Mem.  faculty  New  Sch.  for  Social  Research,  N.Y.C.,  1963-64,  Rutgers  (N.J.)  U.,  1966,
[Vol.  4:  127
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the ordinary  obligations  of full-faculty  status while providing  him with
some financial  security.  He describes the nonrenewal  as  being  fired.  If
Bennington's usual practice has been to rehire people in such positions as
many times as they want, that description is accurate.  Calling the nonre-
newal  a tenure denial,  however,  is not.
The second and more important point is that when Hoagland's article
was  published,  a  month  before  the  Christian Science Monitor article,
Hoagland had  in fact been  rehired.  Hoagland's article  ended by noting
that he had appealed his case to the college's Personnel Review Commit-
tee.  According  to Bennington's  president,  "before  the article appeared
... [the  committee] concluded  that an injustice had been done and rec-
ommended that it be remedied."  The college, again according to its pres-
ident,  "acted  promptly  and decisively...  by deciding  to  offer him the
position for which he had been a candidate."' 4
The Christian  Science Monitor's off-hand  summary  of the  Hoagland
episode is unfortunately typical of the reporting  on political correctness.
Its most characteristic  feature, in fact,  is  that it relies  on no reporting
whatsoever.  The  victim's account  of the incident  is the only  source  of
evidence.  The  reports  never  note that  victims  have  a  perfectly  under-
standable  desire to present what happened  to them in a way  that makes
them appear best.  When the reports are offered by people with a political
ax to grind,  one can fairly  wonder  exactly what happened.  The proper
conclusion,  I think, is that accounts offered by politically interested peo-
ple drawn almost  entirely from the victim's side of the story almost cer-
tainly overstate the extent to which something called political correctness
came into play.
B.  D'Souza and Macneil as Sources
I use an incident involving Harvard Law School reported, if that is the
word,  by  Dinesh D'Souza,  as  the  vehicle  for  a  more  detailed  analysis.
D'Souza's political  orientation is clear.  He began  his career in journal-
ism as the editor of the controversial Dartmouth Review.  According  to a
profile  in the  Washington Post, there  was  "an  old joke on his  name-
'Distort D'Newsa.'  0,1s
In a favorable review  of D'Souza's book, C. Vann Woodward  says of
D'Souza's  "accuracy  of  reporting"  that  D'Souza  "occasional[ly]
stretch[es]  evidence  and  logic  to  score  a  point"  and  provides  "fairly
Sarah Lawrence Coll.,  Bronxville, N.Y.,  1967,  1971,  CUNY,  1967,  68,  U.Iowa,  1978, 82,  Columbia
U.,  1980,  81; with  Bennington  Coll. Vt.,  1987,  88,  89,  Brown U.,  1988,  U.Calif.,  Davis,  1990-."
14.  Elizabeth Coleman, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,  1991,  at A24.  I must note, of
course, that it remains possible  that the college  knew  that Hoagland's article  was about  to appear
and acted as promptly and decisively as it did precisely to allow the president to be able to write such
a letter.
15.  Charles  Trueheart,  Big  Man  Off Campus,  WASHINGTON  POST,  April  19,  1991,  at  B4.  I
should  note that, in the present context,  it is not entirely clear whether I ought to quote this "joke."
1992]
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detailed,  if sometimes  very  selective"  documentation. 6  This  demon-
strates Woodward's generosity  of character.  In describing  the debate at
Stanford  over  revising  its  "Western  culture"  requirement,  D'Souza
states  that  a  "sparsely  attended"  faculty  meeting  voted  to  replace  a
" 'great  books' curriculum"  with a new program.  The former director of
the  Stanford  News  Service  has  written,  "Perhaps  [D'Souza]  confuses
Stanford with St. John's College,"  because  there was no previous  "great
books"  curriculum.  Further, the director said, the faculty meeting "was
filled to overflowing,"  with  51 of 55  voting representatives  attending.17
D'Souza devotes a little over two pages to the incident I examine. 8  In
1989 Ian Macneil of the Northwestern  University Law School was Rob-
ert Braucher  Visiting Professor  of Law at  Harvard.  In late March the
Harvard  Women's  Law  Association  published  an  "open  letter,"  with
copies specifically  distributed  to  "five  top administrators,  including the
dean,"  criticizing  Macneil  for "repeated  instances  of sexism."  Macneil
responded with his own letter to the Harvard Women's Law Association.
What can a reader of D'Souza and  Macneil  find out about what hap-
pened?  Less than  one  needs to evaluate the incident's  implications  for
political correctness.  D'Souza relies on the published  letters and, appar-
ently, an interview with Macneil;  there is no evidence in his book that he
attempted to discuss the incident with representatives  of the HWLA or
the  Law School administration.
I begin  at the end of the story.  According  to D'Souza, Macneil  was
"bitter"  and  "chose[ ]  not  to  seek  an  extention  [sic]  of  his  teaching
appointment  but  to  move  on  to  Northwestern  University  School  of
Law."  This  sentence  ought to set off bells  of suspicion  to one  familiar
with elite law school  hiring practices.  These schools tend to distinguish
sharply,  and  relatively  explicitly  in  their  negotiations  with  visitors,
between  "look-over"  visits,  that is, those  in contemplation  of a  perma-
nent  position,  and  other  visits,  typically  to  fill  temporary  curricular
needs.  D'Souza hints, without  ever quite  saying,  that Macneil  did not
receive an appointment because of the controversy.  Macneil is more cau-
tious, writing  that he "very  much doubt[s] that Harvard  ever intended"
to offer him a permanent position, "but if it had, I am quite sure that the
16.  C. Vann  Woodward, Freedom and the Universities, NEW  YORK  REVIEW  OF  BOOKS,  July
18,  1991,  at  32.
17.  Beyers, Machiavelli  Loses Ground at  Stanford, Bible Holds Its Own,  CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION,  June  19,  1991,  at  B2.  For  additional  challenges  to  D'Souza's  reporting,  see  Jon
Wiener,  What Happened at Harvard, NATION,  Sept.  30,  1991,  at  384;  Maurice  Isserman,  Travels
with Dinesh, TIKKUN,  Sept.-Oct.  1991,  at  81,  83-84;  George  M.  Fredrickson, Letter to the Editor,
N.Y.  REV.  BOOKS,  Sept.  26,  1991,  at 74;  Gene  H.  Bell-Villada,  Letter to  the Editor, N.Y.  REV.
BooKS, Sept. 26,  1991, at 75.  In response to the last item, Professor Woodward stated that he "was
wrong.  . . -another  score as well against  Mr. D'Souza."  C. Vann  Woodward, Reply, N.Y.  REV.
BooKS,  Sept. 26, 1991,  at 76.  At this point,  I believe  that one would go  seriously wrong in relying
solely on D'Souza  as a source of information  about events on which  he reports.
18.  DINESH  D'SouZA,  ILLIBERAL  EDUCATION  197-99  (1991).  In my  account  I  also rely  on
Macneil's  detailed Letter to the Editor, COMMENTARY,  March  1990,  at  10,  11.
[Vol.  4:127
6
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 4 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol4/iss1/6Tushnet
very  making of such charges  would have rapidly changed  its mind, not
out of principle, but out of a desire to avoid controversy."  Macneil  was,
after  all,  the  Braucher  Visiting Professor,  which  suggests  that he  was
holding a position designed for one-year appointments.  Lateral  appoint-
ments  to the  Harvard  Law School  faculty are  relatively  unusual, 9  and
the  word  "Visiting"  in  the  title  suggests,  as  Macneil  indicates,  that
Harvard did not intend to  consider him  for a permanent position.2'
Suppose, then, that the HWLA letter had no immediate consequences
for Macneil's career.21  What are we to make of the incident?  According
to D'Souza, it placed  Macneil's reputation "on  the line,"  and,  "because
of the nature of the charges, their gravity, and their essential unanswer-
ability, Macneil  . ..  felt that 'I  could  not really  clear  myself.'  "22  The
charges were indeed grave; the HWLA letter said that Macneil  expressed
sexist attitudes and failed to take women's concerns seriously.  The sense
in  which  they  are  unanswerable,  though,  is  puzzling.  Macneil  might
have  defended  himself by  saying  that he did  not  make  the  comments;
that surely would be an answer.  Or he might have defended himself, as
he did, by saying that the comments were not really sexist.  If persuasive,
that too would be an answer.  The problem, as I will argue briefly below
and more extensively  in the next section, is that Macneil's claim that he
was not sexist was unpersuasive.  It is not so much that the charges were
grave and unanswerable as that they were grave and unanswered, even by
Macneil.
Macneil  suggested  that  there was another problem  with the  charges.
About two weeks after the HWLA letter was distributed, Macneil replied
with his  own.23  Not only were  they wrong on the merits, he wrote, but
he
had been convicted of an offense  without a hearing,  indeed without
19.  Working  with  the  1990-91  AALS  Directory of Law  Teachers,  I conclude  that  since  1985
Harvard Law School has made three lateral appointments  (Mary Ann Glendon in  1986,  after a visit
in  1974-75,  Reinier Krpakman in  1987,  after a visit in  1986-87, and  William Afford in  1990, after a
visit  in  1988-89).  In  my judgment,  the  two  most  recent  lateral  appointments  are  special  cases
(because  Professor  Kraakman  was  hired  from  Yale  Law  School  and  because  Professor  Afford
specializes  in Pacific  Rim law).
20.  It is  hard  to avoid  some psychological  speculation  here.  Harvard  being  what  it  is  in  the
academic  hierarchy,  I  suspect that, despite  whatever  official  signals  Macneil  got,  in  his  heart of
hearts he would have liked to  get an offer of a permanent  position even if he did not want to stay at
Harvard.  (Receiving such  an offer has obvious  psychological  attractions, and  it could be  used  in
bargaining with one's  home  institution.)  By  March,  when  the  incident erupted,  I  suspect that  he
would have  had to be close  to reconciling  himself to the fact  that he  was not going to  get such an
offer.  Attributing  that  fact  to the  incident  rather  than  to Harvard's  judgment  on  the  merits  is
obviously psychologically  attractive.
21.  It might have long-term consequences,  if Macneil  gets a reputation as a sexist because of the
incident.  My sense of the legal academic community is that that has not happened yet.  It is also my
sense,  based  on  the  analysis  of Macneil's  response  I provide  in  Part  II,  that  if he  does  get that
reputation,  it will not be because of the HWLA  letter but because  he  is.
22.  D'SOUZA,  supra note  18,  at  197,  199.
23.  The  HWLA letter  was dated March  23; Macneil's  response  was dated  April  3.  D'SouzA,
supra note  18,  at 295.
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even knowing that I had been charged;...  the conviction was based
on  statements  of  unnamed  informers;  and  . . . punishment  had
already been administered  in the form of libel.24
Here too one  has  to be alert to what is  implicit  in the  incident.  First,
note the language of criminal charges and convictions,  which would seem
to  be  inapposite  where,  as  it  seems,  no  material  consequences  flowed
from the HWLA letter.  Macneil said that the letter itself was "intimidat-
ing,"  and he obviously  was extremely upset by it.  Still, on the face of it
the letter  simply  says that some  students  disagreed  with what  Macneil
had  said  in  class.  Later  Macneil  said  that  "teachers  and  students  are
entitled to express  ...  views  [like his]  without fear."2   Why  should not
students  be  entitled to  express  views  contrary  to his  without  eliciting
such an extreme  response as Macneil's?26
Second, notice  the reference to unnamed informers.  We are supposed
to think back to the McCarthy era, to which Macneil refers, when people
were  indeed  fired  from jobs  on  the  basis  of information  provided  by
unnamed informers.  But what exactly was involved?  The HWLA letter,
which  was  signed  by  the  Association's  chair,  criticized  Macneil's
casebook  for  including  probably  the  most  celebrated  quotation  from
Byron's Don Juan, referring to Julia, who, "whispering,  'I will ne'er con-
sent,'--consented. '"I"  The  quotation  does  appear  in  the  book,  and,
although referring to unnamed informers  would seem entirely irrelevant
as to this charge, surely the signature of the HWLA's  chair is sufficient.
Other charges  involved  some of Macneil's  comments  in his contracts
class.  "Unnamed  informers"  might be more relevant here, but it is not.
First, Macneil never denied making the statements;  his defense was that
they did not show that he was sexist.  Second,  at Harvard the contracts
course runs for a full year.  Consider a woman student who found Mac-
neil's comments objectionable.  Surely it would  be reasonable for her to
believe  that disclosing her name to Macneil might place her at risk dur-
ing  the  grading  process-if only by  making it less  likely  that  Macneil
would  increase  her grade because  of her class performance  after giving
her an  exam grade through an anonymous  process.28
24.  Macneil,  supra note  18,  at  10  (summarizing  opening  of  Macneil's  letter  in  response  to
HWLA  letter).
25.  Id. at  11.
26.  For additional  discussion,  see Part III infra.
27.  For another  appearance in  the legal  literature, see Everson  v.  Bd. of Educ.,  330  U.S.  1, 19
(1946)  (Jackson,  J.,  dissenting).  This  quotation  does  not  appear  in  the  excerpts  of  the  case  in
GEOFFREY  R.  STONE,  Louis  M.  SEIDMAN,  CASS  R.  SUNSTEIN  &  MARK  TUSHNET,
CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  1493  (2d  ed.  1991),  or WILLIAM  B.  LOCKHART,  YALE  KAMISAR,  JESSE
CHOPER &  STEVEN  SHIFFIN,  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  1093-94  (7th  ed.  1991).  But  see GERALD
GUNTHER,  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  1507  (12th  ed.  1991);  WILLIAM  W.  VAN  ALSTYNE,  FIRST
AMENDMENT  773  (1991).  My hypothesis  is  that sensitivity  to the  use of  the quotation varies  on
generational  lines.
28.  I should note as well that faculty members at Georgetown have been told that some students
here simply  do not believe  that exams are  graded  anonymously.
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Finally,  Macneil seems not to have appreciated the significance  of the
fact that he did not "even  know[ ] that he had been charged."  Why did
the  women  students  choose  to express  their  disagreements  through  a
public  letter  rather  than  through  a  private  discussion  with  Macneil?
Macneil  says  that  "HWLA's  expressed  goal  was  to prevent  Harvard
from  making  me an  offer of a permanent  appointment."29  That, how-
ever,  only  shifts  the question back  one  stage.  Why  did  the association
want  to block a permanent appointment?
My  experience  suggests that  the  HWLA's  course  of action  provides
evidence of a breakdown in classroom communication  that lends support
to the charges of sexism.  Although I am uncomfortable with using spe-
cific  personal  experiences  as  the basis for a  critical  analysis  of another
teacher's  performance,a°  I  recently  had some that bear  on the  Macneil
episode.  In successive years students came to me after the class in which
I discussed Bowers v. Hardwick. 3'  One year a conservative  student told
me that  I characterized  Chief Justice  Burger's concurring opinion in an
unnecessarily harsh way, making it difficult for students who agreed with
the result to speak up in class.  The following  year a gay student told me
that I had characterized the claim that homosexuality was an immutable
trait in an unnecessarily  deprecating  way.
What  I  find  significant  about  these  incidents  is  that  the  students,
believing that I had behaved  badly in class, told me so to my face in an
informal  setting.  The  fact  that the women  students  in Macneil's  class
were not comfortable in doing the same with him suggests that, whatever
the  possibility  of  an  articulate  defense  against  the  particular  charges,
something was going on in Macneil's classroom to which he should have
been paying attention but  was not.32
In  short,  there  is  both  less  and  more  to  the  Macneil  incident  than
29.  Macneil,  supra note  18,  at  10.
30.  See  Mark Tushnet, On Being a Bad Law Teacher, CLS: NEWSLETTER OF THE  CONFERENCE
ON  CRITICAL  LEGAL  STUDIEs  22  (May  1987).
31.  478 U.S.  186  (1986).
32.  I acknowledge  that  the gay  student may have approached me as he did because  he believed
that I was fundamentally on his side, and that the conservative student may have done so because  he
was just a nice guy.  As to the latter, and without reference to the particular student (who I have no
reason to believe was involved),  I note that about a month later I  returned  from vacation to find out
that  some apparently  conservative  students  had distributed an unsigned letter  to some  members of
the  faculty  criticizing me partly on  political  grounds.  I did not care  enough about  the incident  to
investigate,  so I do not  know precisely what was in the letter or who received  it.  I gather, however,
that it criticized  me in part for trying to indoctrinate my students in my left-wing views, for being a
bad teacher, and for being on leave a great deal while drawing a large salary.  (It  struck me that the
authors might not have realized that they had written a classic "bad  news, good news"  letter: "The
bad news is that he tries to indoctrinate  students; the good news is that he's not very good at it, and
he's not around enough to do much  of it anyway.")  I recount the incident  to show only that  not all
conservative students  at Georgetown are nice.  Perhaps  the anonymity of the letter signals  the kind
of breakdown in classroom communication I  mentioned in connection with Macneil, but, from what
I gathered about the letter, it did not have the accusatory  tone rooted  in specific classroom incidents
that the HWLA  letter did, which suggests to me that the author(s) were not particularly concerned
about  what had  happened  to them.
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D'Souza and Macneil present.  There is less to it because, for all the sug-
gestions about losing a job and McCarthyism, Macneil seems not to have
suffered  a great  deal  materially from  the  incident.  There  is  more to  it
because,  for  all  the  suggestions  that  the  HWLA  was  inappropriately
attempting  to advance  a  particular  political  agenda,  there  is  reason  to
believe that the women students were accurately perceiving difficulties in
Macneil's  pedagogy.  On  the basis  of the  published  reports,  though,  a
detached  observer  would  find  it  hard  to  figure  out  exactly  what  had
happened.
C.  Conclusion
The  political  correctness  story  plainly  needs  better  reporting.  And
again, when serious reporters actually pursue a story in detail, it can turn
out to be rather different  from  the  "urban  legend"  that the  underlying
incident generates.  Here is an account  of an incident at a lecture spon-
sored by the National Association of Scholars, dealing with the fall of the
Berlin Wall.
3 3  Newsday  reporters did  serious reporting  about the inci-
dent, relying on interviews and "an  audio tape of the first 60 minutes of
the  talk."'3 4  A rumor  circulated  on  campus that a member  of the  Ku
Klux Klan was to speak at the meeting.  Hispanic and African-American
students organized a protest.  Outside  the lecture hall a faculty member
leading the group admonished them  "to refrain from disruption."  They
entered the hall "in  an orderly manner."  The disruption occurred  about
15 minutes into the talk and lasted, according to the tape, for four min-
utes,  after which  the  lecture  concluded  "without  incident  or interrup-
tion."  The student who disrupted the lecture exchanged obscenities with
the lecturer, "tossed  a wad of chewing gum"  at one of the lecturer's col-
leagues,  and deposited  a used  Kleenex  in the lecturer's  coffee cup.  The
lecturer  afterwards  said  that "more  forceful  acts  seemed  possible"  and
that the situation "felt quite ugly to him."  An investigator for the cam-
pus police  said that "it was just one case of disruption  by one  individ-
ual". '3   Here  is how  a  Wall Street Journal editorial,  "Return  of the
Storm  Troopers,"  described the incident:
Two  hundred  students-some  carrying  sticks  and  canes--come
roaring into a quiet lecture hall and post themselves  menacingly  in
the aisles and  at the exits.  The threat of violence is clear and soon
fulfilled.  The mob disrupts the talk, jeers the speaker.  An elderly,
distinguished  professor in the audience  barely  escapes  a beating  at
33.  The  National  Association  of Scholars  is a group of professors  who  organized  to  offer an
alternative  to what  they perceived  as the  political correctness  movement.
34.  That there was  a tape of the first 60  minutes already  suggests that the talk could  not have
been  too terribly  disrupted.
35.  Fireman, supra  note  9, at 34.
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the hands of one  of the mob.36
II.  QUESTIONS  OF  PEDAGOGY
Two  issues  routinely  get confused  in discussions of political  correct-
ness: whether someone had a right to say something, and whether he was
right to say it.  The Macneil incident  is typical.  Macneil  calls his critics
"McCarthy-ite"  because they objected to his expressing the view, at least
for pedagogic purposes, that "the  sexual relation was in fact-and prop-
erly so-like a commercial  exchange." 37  That,  however,  was not what
they objected to (or at least so it appears from the accounts by D'Souza
and Macneil, a qualification  I will hereafter omit).  They did not object to
his expressing the view.  They objected  to the  view,  that  is, to the claim
that  the sexual  relation  was  in  fact  like  a  commercial  exchange,  and,
more important, they objected to the way in which he expressed the view.
My  concerns  as  an  educator  lie with the  latter issue,  because  it raises
important questions about appropriate  pedagogy.38
A.  The Politics of Language and Failed  Jokes
Macneil  got  into  trouble,  he  says,  in  part  because  of his  efforts  at
humor.  Unfortunately, he plainly does not understand what the problem
was.  The HWLA letter said that Macneil had made  "flippant,  disparag-
ing remarks"  in
dealing  with  language  that  might  be  considered  sexist.  Among
them:  'Posner  was  the  grandfather-or  should  I  say  grand-
mother?--of this idea.'  'That would be  a strawman-or do we use
that word anymore?'  'Sauce  for the goose, sauce  for the gander-I
don't know, is that sexist?'39
According to D'Souza,  Macneil
claimed that 'the joke is about the difficulties of using the poor old
common everyday English language.'  If he were to stop students or
himself every  time they used a gender-specific phrase, Macneil said,
'the  class would  come  to a grinding  halt.'  Finally Macneil  said  he
believed  his humor was in  good form and  was part of his teaching
style.'
It  seems helpful  to examine the examples to  see what,  pedagogically,
36.  Return of the Storm  Troopers, WALL  STREET J.,  April 10,  1991,  at A22.
37.  Macneil,  supra note  18,  at  11.
38.  A teacher  who holds a  view that  a substantial  number of students finds  offensive  faces  the
pedagogical  problem  of finding a way  to induce  those students  to consider that  view on its merits.
For a brief discussion, see note 32 supra.  I believe Macneil's difficulties arose at least in part because
he failed to solve  that problem.
39.  D'SOUZA,  supra note  18,  at  198.
40.  Id.
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might  have been  going  on.4'  No one contends that  when one mentions
an identified  male person, one  ought to follow up with a gender-neutral
reference.42  In  flagging  the  reference  to Posner,  then,  Macneil,  not  his
women students, interrupted the class and singled out the issue of gender
references  as a matter for attention.  The  other examples  are similar  in
pedagogic  effect.  As Macneil put it, these were  "jokes about the difficul-
ties  of using  everyday  English  to  do everything  everyone  wants  to  do
with  it"  because  they  "juxtapos[ed]"  gender-specific  language  with  "a
non-gender idea."43  I confess to being puzzled  about how ordinary  eve-
ryday English cannot do the job of identifying the originator of an idea
without  a gender-specific  reference;  I think I just did it."
There is a more important issue here.  To  characterize his comments
as  "jokes,"  even  as failed jokes, is  to miss  the pedagogic  point.45  Once
Macneil makes an issue in the classroom about whether he ought to use
gender-neutral  references, at least some students are going to start paying
attention to whether he uses such references  or not, rather than to con-
tract  law.  Those who  are interested  in promoting gender-neutral  refer-
ences  do  not advocate  "stopping  the class"  whenever  a  gender-specific
reference  is used.  They hope that the references  will become  as natural
as gender-specific  references  used to be.  From their point of view,  it is
probably worse to flag the issue obtrusively than to use male-specific ref-
erences unobtrusively.  By obtrusively interjecting the question of gender
41.  I  believe that serious pedagogic  issues are raised  by an instructor's decision  to refrain from
using gender-neutral terms, but Macneil's actions, which did not involve a considered  decision to do
so, raise different  pedagogic  issues, to which I direct my attention.
42.  I  recall reading an article, David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication:  On Navigating
the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U.  PA. L. REv.  1247  (1990),  in which a mad search-and-replace  function
had substituted "she"  and  "her" for every  "he"  and "his,"  even when the reference was to identified
people like Warren  Burger.  I understand that the entire issue of the Law Review was  reprinted with
a corrected version  of the article.
43.  Macneil, supra note  18,  at  11.
44.  Robin West has  suggested to me that Macneil's statements might helpfully  be compared to
these:  "He was a real blackguard--or do we  use that word anymore?"  or "The natural law idea has a
dark  side-I don't know,  is that racist?"
45.  When  Joel Conarroe called  it "startling to see Joseph  Epstein... amusing  himself...  by
likening feminists  to pit bulls and making little jokes about  'Dykes  on Bikes,'" Joel Conarroe, How
I'm PC, N.Y. TIMES,  July  12,  1991,  at A29,  Epstein responded by missing the point and, startlingly,
criticizing  Conarroe for failing "to practice  intellectual scrupulosity."  Joseph  Epstein, Letter to the
Editor, N.Y.  TIMES, July  30,  1991,  at A14.  The first reference, Epstein says, was a remark on "the
snarly  humorlessness  of academic  feminists  ....  [whose]  behavior  made  understandable  the joke
about the couple in Manhattan who, to ward off burglary, argued about whether to get a revolver or
a  pit bull  and  finally  compromised  and  got  a  feminist."  The  second  reference  was  based  on  a
misquotation Epstein picked  up, in which the female  president of the Modem  Language Association
was said to have said that "the attack on the more bizarre aspects  of literary studies was..,  nothing
more  than  an  attempt  'to  preserve  the  cultural  and  political  supremacy  of  white  heterosexual
males.'"  Epstein's comment was  that this was  "less appropriate  to the president  of the MLA than
to  a  member  of Dykes  on  Bikes."  Epstein's  response  ended,  "under  political  correctness,  one
attempts humor at one's peril."  Not quite.  Under any circumstances,  offensive comments are rarely
funny.  And, when one presents offensive comments  under the pretense that they are humorous, one
is fair game for criticism-for  being both offensive  and not funny, which is what Conarroe said.  To
find that Conarroe's statement lacked "intellectual  scrupulosity"  is precisely to demonstrate the vice
Conarroe  identified.
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references,  Macneil made an issue of something  irrelevant to the  course
he was  teaching.  And,  in flagging  the  issue by  making jokes,  Macneil
trivialized it."
Macneil  was  sensitive  to  the issue  when  it  affected  him.  He  com-
plained  that
after  receiving  the ...  letter  I found myself more  distracted  than
ever  from  what  I  was  trying  to  teach.  There  was  one  case,  for
instance,  involving  a male lawyer  who  had started off representing
both parties  to a  real-estate  transaction.  Later,  in  violation  of his
ethical  obligations,  the  lawyer  threatened  one  of the  parties  with
stringent  enforcement  of the contract.  I  referred to him as  having
switched from being a Big Brother to trying to batter the clients and
then  caught  myself.  'Oh,  my  God, brother-battered  women!'  It
took five  minutes before  I really  got  my  mind back to the subject
again.
Yet, that  is precisely what the HWLA objected to in Macneil's  "jokes."
As D'Souza puts it, they found his pedagogy "a barrier to learning and
therefore  a form of discrimination."48  When Macneil interrupted himself
to  flag  the issue  of gender-neutral  language,  he  distracted  some of his
students from the subject of the course.  He may  have had a right to do
that, but he was  not right to do it.
Perhaps, though, the correct response to the HWLA's objection is that
students ought not react to that sort of behavior as they do.  Here com-
plex  pedagogic issues arise.  A  teacher has to start with students  where
they are even as he or she attempts to help them move elsewhere.  That
some students  react badly  to a teacher's  pedagogic style is  a fact of life
with  which the teacher  has to deal.  Teachers,  particularly  as  they  get
older and as the generations of students pass before them, sometimes find
themselves  in  a  pedagogic  environment  where  enough  students  hold
views that the teacher thinks  completely  wrong-headed that some peda-
gogic adjustment  is essential.  One cannot  "get  away"  with some  peda-
gogic styles any more, even if one believes that those pedagogic styles are
more  effective  than  alternatives.  At  that point  the teacher  has  to  do
something.  Of course he or she can ignore the student reaction, but then
he or she can hardly be heard to complain that those  students object to
the pedagogic  style.
Suppose,  for example,  a teacher  believes that her job  is  to make stu-
dents  uncomfortable  with  the  ideas  they  have  come  complacently  to
accept, and also believes that students have become hypersensitive to dis-
46.  I recall attending a conference at which Michael Perry gave a talk in which he routinely and
naturally  used female  terms to refer to judges.  He  was  followed on  the podium  by  Daniel Oliver,
then  (I  believe) of the Federal Communications Commission, who commented  on how barbarous he
thought  Perry's practice  was.  Oliver was followed  on the podium  by Judge  Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
47.  Macneil, supra note  18,  at  10.
48.  D'SouzA, supra note  18,  at  199.
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comfort.  She will not be effective in her primary task-making students
uncomfortable  with their complacency  about ideas-if she  makes  them
uncomfortable  about  themselves.  Given  the  students'  hypersensitivity,
the teacher must  somehow insinuate  herself into the students'  lives,  in
some  sense making them  comfortable  with being in the  classroom  as a
predicate to making them uncomfortable  with their ideas.
I would be a better teacher than I am if I could spell out ways of doing
so.  I  believe  that  simple  self-assurance  and  confidence  in  one's  own
authority-in the sense that one is an authority on the subject of study-
can  go  a long  way  toward  creating  a  classroom  atmosphere  in  which
students can become uncomfortable with their ideas.  Unfortunately, few
teachers today have the required degree of authority; more often, we pre-
tend that we are authorities in the relevant sense, and then bluster in the
classroom for fear of being found out.49  Alternatively,  one might model
the engaged scholar for one's students, by visibly wrestling  with difficult
issues  about  which  one  remains  uncertain.  Again,  few  teachers  today
have the requisite uncertainty;  most of us, across the political spectrum,
are overly  confident that we know the right answers.50  In any event, an
"in  your  face"  attitude does not promise much success.
Macneil  acknowledged  this, but failed  to  appreciate  its implications.
His letter to Commentary opened,
Socratic  teachers demanding  attendance,  preparation,  promptness,
and class participation win few popularity contests in American law
schools.  Especially  at Harvard  Law School  the advocates  of such
professionalism  have  largely either long since  died, retired,  fled, or
hunkered  down  into  quiet  safety.  As  a  visitor  I  therefore  hardly
expected  a very warm welcome  in my contracts class. 5'
Here  Macneil  expressly  aligns himself with an old-fashioned  pedagogy,
which  is  perfectly  all  right,  although  the  contemptuous  tone-albeit
adopted after the events-suggests  other difficulties  Macneil might have
anticipated.  He might have gone on to consider that a teacher who starts
out setting himself against his students is likely to find that some students
will magnify other dimensions of his behavior, making, for example, a big
issue of his  sexism when  it might have gone  less noticed  had they liked
49.  There may be a  special difficulty  in asserting  this sort of authority  in teaching  law.  Simply
put, there is rather little for law teachers  to be authorities about.  In first-year classes, we purport to
be teaching people to think like lawyers, which I suppose  means that we are trying to instill in them
a desire to make extremely precise statements about contested issues of value, and to use  a relatively
small number of distinctive  substantive  arguments that characterize  common-law  reasoning.
50.  I recall being told that Malcolm Sharp once came to his first year Contracts class and, visibly
distressed, told his students that they had to get in touch with the students who had taken the course
the year  before to tell  them that Sharp had changed  his  mind about  "the cow  case,"  Sherwood  v.
Walker, 66  Mich. 568,  33 N.W. 919  (1887).  The story may be apocryphal, or Sharp may have been
feigning distress, but  as a story  it illustrates behavior  that one rarely sees  today.
51.  Macneil, Letter,  supra note  18,  at  10.
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him more as a teacher.52
Alternatively,  the teacher can try to accommodate  the difficulty,  even
while trying to move the students away from their oversensitivity.  I can
imagine a  decent  contracts  class being taught  around the issue  of "the
difficulties of using everyday  English to do everything everyone wants to
do with it."  Indeed, I can imagine that issue being the whole point of a
contracts course.  And I can imagine that it might be appropriate at some
point to discuss the question of gender-specific  terms used to convey gen-
der-neutral ideas as an illustration of the problem.  Finally, I can imagine
the point of the lesson  being that, at least with some culturally  rooted
references like "sauce for the goose, sauce for the gander,"  the juxtaposi-
tion ought to  raise  no problems.  I  suspect, however,  that only a truly
extraordinary  teacher  could,  by  making jokes  about  the  question,  help
students who find gender-specific  references interfering with their ability
to  learn,  move  to  what  the  teacher  thinks  is  a  more  appropriate
position.
5 3
B.  The Politics of Literary Allusions
That Macneil believed that he had answered the HWLA's letter by his
analysis of jokes indicates, once again, that there were more problems in
his classroom  than he was willing to acknowledge.  His  response to the
Don Juan quotation,  which  D'Souza  calls  "the  main  charge"  against
Macneil,  provides  more  evidence  of the  pedagogic  difficulties  that  his
attachment to old-fashioned ways caused in the environment in which he
found himself.
What can  a teacher  accomplish  by  citing something,  like Don Juan,
outside the range of the subject matter?  Macneil explained that the quo-
tation was "a perfect summary"  of an issue in contract law, the so-called
"Battle  of Forms,"  which  occurs,  as  D'Souza  puts  it,  "when  parties
attempt to negotiate contracts on their own terms [and] believe that they
are not dealing on the other person's  terms;  yet they go ahead with the
contract,  knowing  that  both  parties'  initial  terms  cannot  have  been
satisfied."
54
For  a  quotation  like  this  to work  pedagogically,  students  who  are
somewhat  confused  by  the legal  discussion  of the Battle  of the  Forms
must  be  able  to  draw  on  their  appreciation  of the  quotation's  more
52.  I also  find  it hard  to avoid  the  wisdom  of the  evidentiary  rule,  "falsus  in  uno, falsus  in
omnibus"  in  a variant-"Old-fashioned  in one  thing (pedagogy),  old-fashioned in  others (sexism)."
53.  Although  I agree  with the main  point of Eugene Genovese's  review  of Illiberal  Education,
The New Republic, April  15,  1991,  at  30,  I  believe  that  Genovese  underestimates  the  pedagogic
difficulties that would confront a teacher who adopted  Genovese's "First Law of College Teaching,"
that an instructor should "seize  every opportunity  to offend  the sensibilities of his students."  Id.  at
33.  A superb teacher could do so from the outset of the class, and a good one probably ought to do
so by the end of a semester.  Less talented teachers, though, are likely to fail as teachers if they follow
Genovese's  law  these days.
54.  D'SouzA, supra note  18,  at  198.
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homely  way of putting the point.  They will learn the law, that is,  if they
think, "What  happens  in the Battle of the Forms is just like  what hap-
pens when Julia, whispering I will ne'er consent, consents.  Oh, I get it."
The  HWLA  letter  said  that  the  quotation  "exempliflied]  'the attitude
that "women  mean yes when they say no," thereby promoting a danger-
ous misperception which has come under fierce attack.' "  This makes a
substantive  point,  which  bears  on the pedagogy  of the  quotation.  The
letter implies that, whatever might  have been true in the past, for some
students today the quotation fails to work pedagogically.  For them, the
quotation describes a woman being raped, and Macneil's pedagogic point
becomes,  "The  Battle of Forms is just like a rape."  I can imagine that
that was the point Macneil was trying to get across-it is not inconsistent
with his description of the Battle of the Forms, and it may be an accurate
way of thinking about the Battle-but, somehow,  I  doubt it.
Indeed, Macneil seems to have doubted it.  For, he told the HWLA, if
it gave him "an  equally  concise, apt and literate quotation  which makes
this point without sex identification,"  he "would  use it in future revisions
of the casebook."56  Here we can see another, non-pedagogic  function of
the quotation.  Using it demonstrates to students that Macneil  is in con-
tact with  certain classics of literature.  His request  to the  HWLA  sug-
gests  that  he  believes  that  they  ought  to  be  in  contact  with  similar
classics.  The  quotation,  that  is,  simultaneously  makes  a  substantive
point and indicates  a cultural affiliation  which Macneil  has  and recom-
mends to his readers.
Once again, though, Macneil's traditionalism may get in the way of his
pedagogy.  It may  be merely a  regrettable  fact of life, but  these  days  a
quotation from Don Juan is, for many students, roughly like Cervantes's
allusions to Orlando Furioso.  Rather than linking the  author backward
to Byron  and  forward  to  his or her students,  it separates  the students
from  the author.  And,  an  author  who  insists  on using  such  a  quota-
tion-and here the substantive point the quotation is intended to make is
irrelevant-is  deliberately  distancing  himself  or  herself  from  the  stu-
dents.  One might adopt the pedagogic strategy of distancing, as a way of
demonstrating that one is an authority on the relevant subject to students
for whom  one is trying to be model.  Yet,  when the "distancing"  occurs
in connection with a collateral matter such as general cultural literacy, it
.seems likely to get in the way of effective pedagogy.  It becomes another
example  of the kind of behavior  that  may  have  led the  HWLA  to  act
through  a public  letter rather than a private discussion.
But,  Macneil  went  further.  He  "asked"  the  HWLA  to  provide  an
alternative  quotation.  I confess that I find this outrageously  insensitive.
55.  Quoted  from Macneil,  supra note  18,  at  10.
56.  D'SouzA,  supra note  18,  at  198.
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Macneil  is a senior  professor  of law,  self-consciously  a traditionalist  in
pedagogy and, as his quotation from Byron indicates,  in culture as well.
Asking  law  students  to  supply  him  with  an  alternative  quotation
"equally  concise,  apt  and  literate"  can  only  reinforce  the  sense  of
powerlessness  in  the  classroom  that  the students  were  already  expres-
sing. 3 7  The overall  impression left by  reading Macneil's response to the
HWLA  letter, I think, is that he still did not get the point.
C.  Conclusion
A  final  example  of  how  the  political  correctness  controversy  has
obscured serious pedagogic issues comes from New York University Law
School.  As  reported  by  Nat  Hentoff,  the  moot  court board  at  NYU
designed  a  problem  in  which  a  father's  representative  was  to  argue
against awarding a five-year-old  child's custody to her mother, who  was
living  in  a  lesbian  relationship  with  a  companion. 8  Some  students
objected that they were being forced to argue a position that they  found
morally repugnant, and that the father's position, as they saw it, was "so
weak" that they would be "at a disadvantage"  in the moot court compe-
tition.  The  moot  court  board  then substituted  a  problem dealing  with
homeowner liability for injuries resulting from untrimmed trees, and ulti-
mately allowed students to choose whether they would argue the custody
case or the tort case.
Anthony  Amsterdam  argued  that  the  students  who  objected  to the
custody problem  were wrong.  "How  can we ever rid our society of anti-
gay biases  unless  we formulate the strongest arguments we can possibly
make  against  those biases?  And how  can  we  do that if we  don't also
formulate  the  strongest  arguments  that  could  be made  to support  the
biases?"  Amsterdam,  normally quite attentive to questions of pedagogy,
seems to have slipped here.  Although Hentoff, and elsewhere in his argu-
ment Amsterdam, seem to think that the underlying issue is one of fore-
closing  "intellectual  inquiry,"  the  only  real  issue  is  pedagogic.  Will
requiring law students to present arguments on behalf of a position they
find morally  repugnant make  them  better lawyers?
There  are  many issues  to sort out.  First, it seems entirely  irrelevant
that "to rid the society of anti-gay biases,"  someone will have to be able
to rebut the strongest arguments that can be made to support the biases.
Not  all law students-not  even all gay  law students-will  actively take
part  in  the  struggle  for  gay  rights, and it  is not  clear why  future  real
estate  lawyers  should  be  forced  to  take  a  position  they  find  morally
repugnant  simply to exercise their mental muscles. 5 9
57.  But, just to help Macneil out, how about:  "Ad Reinhardt's paintings or John Cage's music."
58.  Nat  Hentoff, 'Politically Correct' at NYU  Law,  WASHINGTON  POST,  Nov.  3, 1990, at A23.
59.  I  have been struck by the fact that Amsterdam's argument suggests that students who were
indifferent  to  the  issues  raised  by  the  problem  ought  to have  objected  to  the  custody  problem
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Second,  there  is  a  difference  between  coming  up  with arguments  in
order to  rebut them, and being forced to stand  up, even in the artificial
setting of a moot court competition, and present them.  Trial and appel-
late advocates  often say that truly effective lawyers present themselves as
if they really believe the positions they are asserting.  It seems to me quite
problematic,  morally,  to  urge  a  student  to become  a  good  lawyer  by
appearing to believe a position he or she finds morally repugnant.  At the
very least, raising the issue,  as the objecting  students did, ought to pro-
voke  serious  thinking  about  the  moral  dimensions  of legal  education
rather than mindless invocations of academic  freedom.
Third, and related, the passage from ordinary citizen to lawyer is mor-
ally hazardous, and law schools ought to be sensitive, in their pedagogy,
to the shoals on which students might founder.'  The lawyer's role-dif-
ferentiated  morality,  in  which  a lawyer  becomes  a  hired  gun  without
standing behind the client's position, makes strenuous moral demands on
a person trying to be good.  At some point, I believe, lawyers have to take
on the moral burdens, but a law school attentive to the morally hazard-
ous passage  would  do well not  to thrust those demands  on its students
too early or abruptly, as  the custody problem did.6"
The  problem,  then,  is  not  that  Macneil  and  the  NYU  moot  court
board were politically incorrect.  The problem is that they were pedagog-
ically incorrect.
III.  QUESTIONS  OF  ACADEMIC  FREEDOM
In  introducing  the  issue  of the  morally  hazardous  passage  into  the
legal profession,  I  have opened  up  a  set of issues  about academic  free-
dom.  I approach these issues by triangulating them.  First, I consider the
appropriate stance an institution of higher education is permitted to take
with respect to the moral formation  of its students.  For, if a university
can take a position about that, many issues that have come up under the
heading of political correctness look very different:  rather than enforcing
an orthodoxy in violation of academic freedom, the universities  are per-
forming  their  permissible  role  of helping  shape the  characters  of their
students.62  Second,  I consider the  relation between student exercises  of
because, on Amsterdam's argument, they were being deprived of the opportunity to develop the best
arguments  in favor  of a position they  found morally  objectionable.
60.  A nice  recent  discussion  of the  hazards  is CHRIs  GOODRICH,  ANARCHY  AND  ELEGANCE
(1990),  a journalist's account  of the  first year at Yale Law  School.
61.  I  simply  note the  additional hazard posed to young  gay and lesbian  people, who routinely
must  confront  the  conflict  between  their  sexual  identities  and  the  society's  most  frequent
communications  about  what  is  morally  appropriate,  by  the  custody  problem.  The  hazard  is
probably  heightened by the fact  that it is a custody problem, and  therefore  raises issues about  the
relationship  between  one's sexual  identity and  the mechanisms of legacy, which, again,  students of
law-school  age are likely to be quite concerned  about.
62.  This  is  one  dimension of  what  has  been  called  "institutional"  academic  freedom,  which
sometimes  appears  to  conflict  with  "individual"  academic  freedom.  For  extensive  discussions,
compare J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom:"  A "Special Concern" of the First  Amendment, 99 YALE
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their  free expression  rights, as  in the HWLA's  distribution of its  letter,
and  the  university's  position  on  academic  freedom.  These  inquiries
frame  the residual issues  of academic  freedom more  precisely.
A.  Universities, Moral Formation, and Academic Freedom
The easiest examples of universities properly taking an interest in their
students'  moral formation are religious institutions with a faith commit-
ment to a particular vision of moral formation.  When a Catholic univer-
sity, for  example,  issues  official  statements  indicating  its disapproval  of
homosexuality,  it is  surely  acting within  its rights  (although,  again,  it
may  not  be  acting  rightly).  Georgetown  University  engaged  in  pro-
tracted litigation  to assert its right to do no more than its faith commit-
ments  permitted  in  its  treatment  of  student  gay  and  lesbian
organizations.63  Notably, when the litigation  ended with the applicable
human rights ordinance  interpreted  in a way  that the  University found
acceptable,  Congress intervened  to  tell  Georgetown  and other  religious
institutions  in  the  District  of  Columbia  that,  if they  wanted  to,  they
could  ignore the human rights ordinance."
Religious  institutions  present  a  particularly  strong case  for  allowing
the university to take a position about moral formation, but the case is,  I
think,  only  slightly  weaker  for  private  universities  without  distinctive
religious  commitments.65  Thus, to use an example that routinely comes
up  in  discussions of political  correctness,  it hardly  seems  objectionable
for Smith College,  a private institution, to give new students a pamphlet
alerting  them to "lookism,"  the "construction  of a standard for beauty"
that may lead people to place value (positive or negative) on what people
say  simply  because  of  the  degree  to  which  they  fit  the  standard  of
beauty.66  Or, at least,  it could  be objectionable  only on the  merits,  for
example, on the ground that lookism is not a serious enough problem to
alert students about.
That the merits  are  what conservative  critics of political correctness
avoid can be  seen by  noting  the controversy  over higher education  that
immediately preceded the political correctness controversy.  This contro-
versy over higher education  was precipitated by Allan Bloom's The Clos-
L.J. 251  (1989)  (leaning toward resolving conflicts  in favor of institutional freedom),  with David A.
Rabban,  A  Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional"  Academic Freedom Under the
First  Amendment,  53 LAW  &  CONTEMP.  PROBs.  227 (Summer  1990)  (leaning the other way).
63.  Gay Rights  Coalition  v.  Georgetown Univ.,  536  A.2d  1 (D.C.D.C.  1987).
64.  P.L. 101-168,  §  141  (1989).
65.  On the constitutional  level, Oregon Dep't of Human Services v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872  (1990),
seems rather clearly to imply that arguments about religious and non-religious  universities are to be
analyzed  in  the same  way.  For  a  somewhat  more  extended  discussion,  see  Tushnet,  Public and
Private Schools: Is  There a Constitutional  Difference,  1991  U.  CHI.  LEGAL  F.  43.
66.  For a citation to the pamphlet,  see Lucas, Free Speech Falls to the Campus Thought Police,
THE  INDEPENDENT,  June  9,  1991,  at  13.  For a discussion of the problems  created by  lookism, see
NAOMI  WOLF,  THE BEAUTY  MYTH  (1991).
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ing of the American Mind, whose message was precisely that universities
were  shirking their  obligation  to assist  in the  moral  formation of their
students by accepting the orthodoxy  of relativism.  It seems particularly
confused to criticize universities both for trying to tell their students that
some  behavior  is  right and  other  behavior is  wrong  (as  with  lookism,
sexism, or racism), and for inculcating relativism, but it has been done.67
The  only  way  to  make  sense  of this discourse  is to  understand  that
critics of political correctness are trying to disagree with some particular
values that the universities are inculcating,  without explaining  why uni-
versities should  attempt to inculcate different  values.  The  role that the
"lookism"  statement  plays  in  discussions  of political  correctness  is,  I
think, revealing.  The rhetorical moves are evident: the writer takes con-
cern  about  lookism  to  be  almost  universally  regarded  as  silly.  The
implicit  message  is,  "You'd  have to  be  a  real  fanatic  to be  concerned
about something as frivolous as 'lookism.' "'6  The writer then associates
that effort  with  communications  about sexism and racism.  Having dis-
credited the concern  for lookism, the writer attempts to discredit the lat-
ter as well.69  And, of course, all this occurs without any overt discussion
of whether  it  is a  good  thing or a bad thing for universities  to be con-
cerned  about  their  students'  moral  formation  regarding  racism  and
sexism.
To  proceed  further,  I  must  expand  the  examples  in  two  directions.
First, suppose the university takes its position, not in a generalized state-
ment, but in  a  more  focused  setting.  For example,  according  to News-
week,  Mt. Holyoke's  president "upbraided"  students who "mocked"  the
college's gay  and lesbian student association "by proclaiming 'Heterosex-
ual  Awareness  Week,'"  saying that they  "violat[ed]  the spirit of 'com-
munity.' "7o  To  clarify  the problem,  let me assume  that the only  thing
the president did was issue a statement, and that the statement included a
forthright declaration that, although the students were within their rights
to mock other students, they should  not have done so.  Second, suppose
67.  See,  e.g.,  Novak, Thought  Police, FORBES  MAGAZINE,  Oct.  1, 1990, at 212.
68.  In  light of this  assumption,  I  suppose  I  should  state  explicitly  that  I  do not  regard  the
concern as frivolous.  For a discussion of discrimination on the basis of appearance,  see Note, Facial
Discrimination:  Extending Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination on  the Basis of Physical
Appearance, 100 HARV.  L. REV.  2035 (1987).  Discrimination on the basis of weight or size, which is
certainly  related  to  lookism,  is  widespread.  See,  e.g.,  Note,  The  Rehabilitation Act  of 1973:
Protection  for Victims of Weight Discrimination?,  29 UCLA  L. REV.  947 (1982);  Paul Steven  Miller,
Coming Up Short: Employment Discrimination  Against Little People, 22  HARV.  C.R.-C.L.  L. REV.
231  (1987).  I  am reasonably  confident  that  law  school  faculties  discriminate  on  the  basis  of
appearance  in  hiring,  on the  margins  (where  all decisions  are made).  And,  I find  statements  like
"dumb blonde" on one end, and "So  pretty, and so smart too," on the other, quite offensive.  Finally,
lookism  is bound up  with, though  not  identical  to (consider  the  image of the dumb  surfer  guy),
sexism,  and  I  doubt that  it  is  accidental  that  the  statement  about  lookism  was  issued  by  Smith
College,  a historically  female college.
69.  I believe  that  something  quite  similar  is involved  in  the  failed efforts  at  humor discussed
supra, text  accompanying  notes 41-48.
70.  See Adler,  Taking Offense, supra note 2,  at 48.
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that the  president's statement  is directed not at student behavior but  at
some comments a professor made  in the classroom.  Again,  assume that
the president's statement simply "upbraids"  the professor while acknowl-
edging that academic freedom protected his right to make the comments.
Does the tighter focus of the college's statement about what it believes its
role in students' moral formation to be, in the first example, and the more
indirect connection between the professor's comments and student moral
formation,  in the second,  alter the analysis? 7'
Although a university may properly  take an interest in student  moral
formation,  the values  of academic  freedom  certainly  impose some  con-
straints  on what universities  ordinarily  can do.72  This  essay  is  not the
place to provide a full  analysis of the relation between  institutional self-
definition, which  is what the question of moral formation raises,  and the
academic  freedom  of students and  professors.  For present purposes,  it
seems  sufficient to identify two kinds of constraints.  The first is that the
university ought not pursue its interest  in moral formation in ways that
violate well-established  norms of the academy.  An intemperate denunci-
ation of identifiable students, for example, is almost certainly inappropri-
ate, in part because  it conflicts with  the aim of communicating  to other
students  how  they  should  behave,  but  in  part  because  it  is  unprofes-
sional.73  A  strong  generalized  statement, in  contrast, seems  consistent
both with professional norms and the university's interest, if it chooses to
take one, in moral formation.
The second constraint  is best described  as  political.74  A college may
discredit  its  own  efforts  at moral formation  if those  efforts  become  the
focus  of political  contention  on  campus or  off.  From  the  institution's
point of view, prudence dictates some restraint.  And, more descriptively,
every  university  president  knows  that many  constituencies  are  alert  to
what  happens  on  campus.  Actions  that  alienate  some  constituencies
without generating offsetting support from others will impair the univer-
sity's ability to continue on the course it has  chosen.7"
The political constraints on moral formation are particularly relevant
when we turn from private institutions to public ones.  My  primary con-
71.  It  seems  appropriate  to  note  that  a strikingly  high  number of the  incidents  identified  as
particularly  outrageous  by  critics  of political  correctness  involve  questions  of  sexuality,  either
feminism or gay  and  lesbian rights.
72.  Here as elsewhere  I  use the term  "academic  freedom"  to refer  to a set of values bound up
with education, not to a constitutional doctrine, because the values are relevant, but the Constitution
is  not, to the behavior  of private institutions.
73.  Thus, the Newsweek  account does not provide  sufficient information  for one to evaluate  the
statement  "upbraiding"  the students.  As we have seen,  a proper understanding  of the issues often
involves  consideration  of details  that are omitted  from journalistic accounts.
74.  For reasons that lie behind Part IV, I have refrained from identifying the professional norms
of the academy as a political  constraint,  though in other  settings  I would  do so.
75.  The political  correctness controversy  itself is part of the  political environment.  By  raising
the political heat, conservatives have tried to influence the direction and amount of moral formation
that colleges  and  universities  try to accomplish.
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cern  in this essay  lies with the appropriate  role of universities  in moral
formation, but the ability of public institutions  to play that role  may be
constrained  by the Constitution.  The extent  to which  the Constitution
allows public institutions to shape moral character is, I believe, one of the
most difficult issues  in constitutional  law;  the free expression  and estab-
lishment  of religion  questions  are  excruciating.  Whatever  the  ultimate
resolution  of those questions,  though,  it seems  reasonably  clear  that a
large  portion  of the answer  will  rely on ordinary  political  processes  to
limit moral  formation  by public institutions.76  Within broad limits and
in the long run, that is, whatever public institutions decide to do in con-
nection  with  moral  formation  is  likely  to  be  normatively  acceptable,
given that they face substantial political constraints.  The political setting
in which they operate means that universities-both public and private-
are likely to locate  a  relatively  stable equilibrium  point.  Passing events
may shift the university  away from the equilibrium temporarily, but it is
likely to be reestablished  relatively  quickly.77
Universities that have  a role in  moral  formation must  accommodate
interests in individual freedom, but there is little reason to think that the
right  accommodation  is  simple.  The  best  illustration,  perhaps,  comes
from discussions  of campus hate-speech  regulations.78  Taking  off from
outrageous examples of bureaucratic  mindlessness in applying such regu-
lations, 79  critics of political correctness  treat hate-speech  regulations  of
any sort as clear infringements on individual liberty.  Proponents of such
regulations, whose arguments the critics essentially ignore,80 have shown
that the question is more complicated.
I  only  summarize  the  arguments  here,  to  show  how  a  university's
proper concern for student moral formation complicates the analysis fur-
ther.  The core of free  speech  law has two parts.  One involves  statutes
that  attempt  to ban  speech  because  the  government  believes  that  the
speech  may  cause  harms  like  law-breaking  or  violence.  The  other
involves regulations of streets and parks, which protestors want to use to
get their messages across.  In both parts, the Supreme Court has imposed
rather  substantial  limits  on  what  governments  can  do,  because,  it
76.  The most acute constitutional analysis remains the relatively early  MARK G. YUDOF,  WHEN
GOVERNMENT  SPEAKS:  POLITCS, LAW,  AND  GOVERNMENT  EXPRESSION  IN  AMERICA  (1983).
77.  Of course, because those constraints operate over time, undoubtedly there will be incidents of
excessive  zeal.  For  those  involved  in  the disturbing  incidents,  the costs  are  high, and  university
leaders have not always done all they could to minimize those costs and restore the equilibrium more
promptly.  For  a more extended  discussion, see Part  IV infra.
78.  The literature is already enormous.  For complementary discussions which cite the literature,
see  Peter  Linzer,  White Liberal  Looks at Racist Speech,  65  ST.  JOHN'S L.  REV.  187  (1991);  Grey,
Civil Rights Versus Civil Liberties The Case of Discriminatory  Verbal  Harassment,  8 SOCIAL PHIL. &
POL.  81  (1991).
79.  For  a discussion of the  dynamics of regulation,  see Part  IV infra.
80.  The  most  acute  criticisms  of hate-speech  regulations  have  come  from  liberals,  not  the
conservatives who talk about political correctness.  (I exempt Nat Hentoff from this observation;  he
is a  liberal  who has been  as mindless  about  the issue as conservatives  have.)
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believes,  the  society  as  a  whole  benefits  from  the  wide  availability  of
speech.
The  key to  understanding  free  speech  law  is that  the Court  under-
stands that its rules do not come for free.  When the government cannot
ban speech unless it can show that violence is extremely  likely to occur,
occasionally speech  really  will cause violence (when  the low probability
event actually occurs, as it inevitably will).  And, if the government must
make streets available for demonstrations,  commuters will have to put up
with some disruption of their ordinary activities.  Notice,  however, that
in these core areas of free speech, the costs of allowing speech are distrib-
uted across the whole population.  Everyone bears the risk that violence
will  occur;  everyone  who  uses  the  streets  has  to  put  up  with  the
disruption.
"Hate  speech"  regulations  are different.  There, the costs of the  regu-
lated speech  are concentrated  on vulnerable  populations.  Proponents of
hate speech regulations argue that this difference justifies more stringent
regulation of hate speech than we ought to allow for other types of polit-
ical speech.  That might be particularly true on campus.  The vulnerable
populations  might  be  even  more  vulnerable  because  of their  relative
youth.  And, although everyone might benefit to some degree by hearing
hate speech  (a premise  of the First Amendment that need  not be  chal-
lenged), the amount of benefit is reduced to the degree that the university
believes that such speech is incompatible  with the character it is trying to
shape  in its students-those  who utter the speech  as  well  as those who
hear it.
None  of this  is to  say that the  principle of free  speech justifies what
universities  are said  to  have  done.  The  only  point  is  that hate  speech
regulation, in the university setting,  is not obviously  incompatible  with
the complex blend of institutional and individual academic  freedom that
universities  must develop."'
B.  Students' Free Expression and Intimidation
Macneil  writes  that  the  HWLA  letter  was  "intimidating"  and  was
intended  "entirely to stifle thought  and expression it did not like."82  In
Canada,  an instructor  reports  that  he believed  he  had  his  "first  brush
with the thought police"  after what he calls a "good humored[]"  discus-
sion in his office of a student's misunderstanding  of what he had said in
81.  My own  view on these  questions draws on  a different strand  of First  Amendment  theory,
concerned with the capacity of people  charged with censorship decisions to make sound judgments.
I believe that hate-speech  codes are likely to be administered by people quite insensitive to real issues
of liberty and discrimination, and therefore think that they are unlikely to be a good thing as actually
implemented.  (My  suspicion of administrators is the primary theme of Part  IV infra.) For a more
optimistic  view of the capacity  of university administrators,  see J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and
Free Speech  Within the University, 79 GEo. L.J.  399  (1991).
82.  Macneil, supra note  18,  at  10.
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class about the origins of jazz. 3  D'Souza says that his diaries of his trav-
els promoting his books show a "pervasive illiberalism"  on campus. 8 4  As
an illustration, he offers an account of a lecture he gave at Tufts Univer-
sity.  About 300 hundred students attended.  There were "armed  police-
men" in the auditorium. 5  "Even  more unsettling to me,"  he continues,
"two  black students,  a  man and a  woman,  showed  up bound  to  each
other in heavy metal chains.  They sat in the front row and proceeded to
chain  themselves  to  their  seats."  D'Souza  spoke,  he  writes,  "for  the
usual 40  minutes."  There  were  no disturbances,  but  "on  four  or  five
occasions,  apparently  disgruntled  by my remarks,  the two chained  stu-
dents announced their presence in  the audience  by loudly  rattling their
accessories."
There  is  something  quite  peculiar  here.  Macneil  calls  the  students
"McCarthy-ites,"  D'Souza calls them "goons."  And what did they do?
They published a letter and rattled  some  chains but did not interrupt a
lecture.  On the face  of it, the students  appear  to have  been  exercising
their  ordinary  freedom  of expression. 6  Of course  they  disagreed  with
what  Macneil  and  D'Souza  said, but  surely  neither  intends  us to  take
seriously  the  claim that people who disagree  with  them  are engaged  in
intimidation  or,  to  use  another  phrase  in  the  literature,  are  storm
troopers.
Consider a range of activities Macneil's  students might have engaged
in.  They could  have gone  to an associate  dean to  express their discom-
fort at what Macneil  said in class.  They could have passed out the letter
in the  halls outside  Macneil's  classroom.  They  could  have  urged stu-
dents not to enroll  in Macneil's  elective  courses.  Finally,  suppose that
the students did some or all of this intending  to make it less likely that
Macneil  would  receive  an  offer  of a  permanent  appointment  or, if he
received an offer, less likely that he would accept it.  Would the students
have  behaved  "intolerantly"  or otherwise  wrongly?  If they  really  did
find Macneil's statements  offensive,  it is hard  to see  anything  wrong  in
their actions.  Students should of course be tolerant of views they  disa-
gree  with.  Toleration,  however,  does  not  mean  nodding  sagely  while
someone says something offensive, or refraining from saying anything to
indicate disagreement with the statement.  It may mean that serious and
sustained disruption  of a  speech  or lecture should be  avoided,  so that
others can come to appreciate how offensive the speaker is.  But, neither
Macneil nor D'Souza contends that their lectures were disrupted to that
83.  Lynda Hurst,  'Politically Correct?  Think Before  You  Speak,  TORONTO  STAR,  June 2,  1991,
at Al.
84.  Dinesh  D'Souza,  Cap and Goon,  WASHINGTON  POST,  April 7,  1991,  at  D4.
85.  Id.  D'Souza does  not indicate what the  university's ordinary  police practices  were.
86.  With a modest qualification, dealing with the modest  noise and distraction of attention that
rattling  the  chains  presumably  occasioned.  For  a  brief discussion  of this  qualification,  see  text
accompanying note  87 infra.
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degree.87
Perhaps  toleration  means  putting  up  with  a  lecturer's  inanities  or
offensive  statements  in the lecture hall, confining  the response  to hisses
and  groans,  while  reserving  more  sustained criticism  for other forums.
That, however, is precisely what the HWLA  did.  And, even here, there
might be distinctions to be drawn.  Perhaps  a tolerant student  ought to
be particularly  sensitive to causing disruption at lectures like D'Souza's,
where people attend because they choose to and where, as D'Souza indi-
cates,  an  opportunity  for  audience  discussion  is  available  immediately
after  the lecture.  But,  perhaps the case  is different  for Macneil's  class,
which  was required rather than elective, and in which, his discussion of
his  pedagogy  suggests, opportunities  for disagreement  were  likely  to be
rare.
88
In what sense, then, was the HWLA letter coercive or intimidating?  It
did not directly obstruct Macneil's ability to get his views, whatever they
were,  across.  Of course it made Macneil feel bad, as his reaction makes
abundantly  clear.  But, after  all, Macneil's  expression made  some of his
students feel bad too.  I am puzzled why a professor finds it intimidating
that some of his students express their disagreement with him by writing
a  letter explaining  what they found  offensive  in his actions.89
D'Souza's account  of his Tufts lecture  is plainly meant to convey that
he ran a real risk of physical violence; at one point he writes that he took
"a step backward"  when, after his speech, a professor of Afro-American
studies  said to him,  "You  want to know  why  I have  my hands  in my
pockets  now?  That's because  I'm so angry  I  have  to restrain  myself."
The Canadian professor reports that a colleague told him, "Next time...
the attack will be more organized."  The language of intimidation would
be appropriate if there were a real risk of physical violence.  No such risk
attended  Macneil,  and the  evidence  as  to D'Souza rather  strongly  sug-
gests that he has an exaggerated  sense of physical risk to his person.
The  key,  I  believe,  is  D'Souza's  statement  that  the  charges  against
Macneil  were  unanswerable.  But  Macneil  offered  an  answer  to  the
charges.  I have  already  argued that, on most of the  points, his answer
was  unpersuasive.  To say that the HWLA  was  intimidating because  it
87.  It is not even clear that the incident reported by Newsday involved  such disruption.  See text
accompanying  notes 33-35 supra.
88.  In  labor  law,  managers  must  sometimes  provide  opportunities  for organizers  to  use  their
property  (roughly, where there are no real  alternative means of getting access to workers to convey
the  organizers'  message).  There  might  be  an  analogy  in  the  university  context,  particularly  in
connection  with  required  courses.  The labor  law  requirements,  though,  are  triggered  only  under
quite  restrictive  circumstances,  such  as  the  unavailability  of other  ways  of  reaching  the  target
audience,  and the analogies  to those  circumstances  are unlikely  to exist on campus.
89.  On the psychological  level,  the letter may have been intimidating because  it "threatened"-
metaphorically  to me, but really to Macneil-the  degree of control over the classroom that he found
essential  to his  self-image.  (A  comment  by  Robin  West  led  me  to this  formulation,  which  is  not
hers.)
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made unanswerable  charges is, under these circumstances,  to say that it
is intimidating to disagree with Macneil.  If there is any totalitarianism in
these events,  it is that assertion.
C.  Official Power and Intimidation
Critics  of political correctness  toss about  terms like  "McCarthy-ite,"
"storm troopers,"  and "thought police."  As applied to incidents like the
HWLA  letter  or  D'Souza's  Tufts  lecture,  those  terms  seem  strikingly
inapt.  A  large part of what made McCarthyism  wrong was that behind
Senator  McCarthy's  expressions  lay  the force  of the  government--or,
more  broadly,  official  power."  Most  of the  remainder  of what  made
McCarthyism  wrong was that official power  was called down upon peo-
ple for what they  did outside the classroom.9"
Discussions  of political  correctness  rarely  provide  examples  of inci-
dents in which, at the end of the day, official power was used to enforce
political  correctness; the Hoagland story that I opened with  is typical.92
At most,  the  incidents show  administrations  taking  too long  to do the
right thing.  That  is  an  important  phenomenon,  to which  I devote  the
next section.  But, what is then involved  is the failure of universities  to
exercise their power, which raises another set of issues.  Thus, I am con-
fined to a hypothetical  case, to show once again that what is at issue  in
the political correctness discussion is much more complicated  than most
participants  are willing to admit.
Stanley  Fish  of  Duke  University  proposed  that  university  officials
refrain from appointing members of the National Association of Scholars
to university  committees dealing with tenure  and promotion.  I suspect
that  Fish was  not  entirely  serious  in  making  this  proposal,  and  to no
one's surprise it was rejected.  Suppose, however, that the university had
agreed  with  Fish.  It  would  certainly  look  like  an  exercise  of official
power--denial  of positions  otherwise  available  to  faculty members-in
the service of political correctness.
Consider, though, the following scenario.  Suppose that literary studies
and political  science had both been dominated for years by  ethical rela-
90.  Similarly  as to Storm  Troopers, at least  after  1933.
91.  See  ELLEN  SCHRECKER,  NO  IVORY  TOWER:  MCCARTHYISM  AND  THE  UNIVERSITIES
(1986);  Gerald  Frug, McCarthyism and Critical Legal Studies, 22  HARV.  C.R.-C.L.  L.  REV.  665
(1987).  The rest of what  was wrong  with McCarthyism  is that it was wrong on the  merits.  Once
again,  we see how a particular  rhetoric is used  to avoid discussion of the merits.
92.  For another example, see Editorial, PC at Hampshire College, WALL  ST. J., Jan. 4,  1991,  at
A6.  As usual, the incident is complicated and badly reported.  Apparently,  a faculty committee  had
recommended reappointment  for two professors whose  comments had  attracted  adverse comments
as  politically  incorrect.  The  president  referred  the  matter  to  the  college  committee  on  faculty
appointments; the editorial suggests that was unusual (although  in one case the faculty vote was 20-
7,  and  many  institutions  do  take  special  care  in  cases  where  there  are  a  substantial  number  of
negative votes).  The committee recommended  against renewal.  One professor then appealed to the
committee  on  academic  freedom,  which  found  in  his favor.  When  the  editorial  appeared,  the
president  had referred  the matter to "yet another  academic  body,"  otherwise  undescribed.
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tivists who did not believe that there were correct interpretations of texts
or  events,  only  constructs  observers  imposed  on  them  afterwards.
Recently,  however,  serious  students  of literature  have  come  to  believe
that texts do indeed have  objectively  correct readings.  That has caused
turmoil  in the  discipline, with  charges of bad scholarship  and bad faith
being flung by the relativists and the objectivists.  At one university, after
going through  many  struggles over hiring and promotion  decisions, the
literature  faculty has reached  an  accommodation  between  the old-fash-
ioned relativists and the new objectivists.  They are concerned, however,
that appointments and promotions in their department will be considered
by a university-wide  committee that has members from the political  sci-
ence  department,  where  the  old  relativist  orthodoxy  prevails  unchal-
lenged.  The  literature faculty  could,  I  think, reasonably  be  concerned
that such a committee might not be able to consider fairly their recom-
mendations  on appointment  and tenure,  because the  political  scientists
are likely  to think that the objectivist  works some literature candidates
present  are  simply  outside  the  bounds  of scholarly  acceptability.  The
literature  faculty  might  propose  that  the  university  authorities  not
appoint to the university-wide tenure and promotion committee members
of the political science  department.
With  some  modifications,  that is Fish's  proposal.9"  I am  inclined to
think that it ought to be rejected because the assumption that people with
strongly  held  views  about  what  counts  as  serious  scholarship  cannot
fairly  assess  work  by  people  with different  criteria  for judging  serious
scholarship  is probably  wrong.  But,  I do not believe  that the  proposal
necessarily rejects fundamental premises of academic freedom.  Indeed, it
aims  to  promote  academic  freedom,  and  it can  be  rejected  only  after
fairly considering  whether it or the traditional practice is the better way
to do so.
IV.  PROBLEMS  OF  UNIVERSITY  ADMINISTRATION
I have  argued that the issues associated with political correctness are
far  more  complicated  than  most  discussions  have  assumed.  I  do  not
mean  to  suggest  that  there  are  no  problems  whatever.  The  problem,
though,  is  not  that universities  are  under a  reign  of terror  in which  a
liberal orthodoxy  is imposed on an unwilling faculty  and  student body.
The  problem,  I  believe,  is  that  university  administrators  really  do not
have  any idea  about  the educational  aims of their university.  They see
93.  Given  the  circumstances  under  which  he  made  the  proposal,  and  his  likely  lack  of
seriousness  about  it,  I take  it to  be a  minor misstep  that  Fish suggested  that  no  members of  the
National Association of Scholars be appointed to the relevant committee.  If, as I suspect, there is a
fairly high correlation between  membership and belief in objectivism,  the misstep is understandable,
but  properly  stated the proposal  ought  to  be that  no one  who  believes  in objectivism  ought to be
appointed.
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themselves as politicians and managers who happen to work in an educa-
tional  institution,  but do not  see  education  as  something  that they  are
particularly  concerned  about  except  when  it  comes  time  to  make
speeches.  Lacking  a  vision  for  the  university,  some  administrators
become bureaucrats mindlessly pursuing specific  programs without con-
sidering how those programs  fit into some overall vision;  others become
crisis managers, handling specific problems as they arise and losing inter-
est once the political pressure to do something about the problem passes.
A.  The "Base Rate" Problem
This characterization  of the problem  rests  on  some  inferences  about
what has been  happening  on campus, and I doubt that I can make the
case fully here.  Some of the inferences  can be drawn from  the political
correctness  literature,  particularly  from  comments  on  administrators'
ineffective  response  to incidents  of political correctness.  There is, how-
ever, an important gap in the literature, known to social scientists as the
"base  rate"  problem.  We really do not know how many  problems arise
from liberal political correctness and how many from efforts by conserva-
tives to enforce their orthodoxy, and despite the claims in the newspapers
we certainly have no way of determining whether incidents of orthodoxy-
enforcement  have occurred  more frequently  recently.
I can draw on my experience in the legal academy for two points about
the base rate.  First, if the measure of orthodoxy-enforcement  is denial  of
tenure or nonrenewal  of appointments, the problem of political  correct-
ness pretty clearly arises from the right rather than from the left at many
universities.9"
Second,  and  more  important  here,  the  population  of  law  students
today exercised  about deviations  from  liberal orthodoxy  is  almost cer-
tainly  no larger  than the population  exercised  by deviations  from  con-
servative  orthodoxy."  Teaching  some  aspects  of constitutional  law-
notably, affirmative action and abortion-is like walking through a mine
field.  An instructor who  articulates  firmly held views on these  subjects
either  way  will  inevitably  offend  a  substantial  segment  of the  class.
Worse, an instructor who tries to suggest that the issues raised by affirm-
ative action or abortion are more complicated than either liberal or con-
servative  orthodoxy  will satisfy almost no one.  I should  stress, though,
94.  See, e.g.,  Abel, supra note  8,  which  enumerates  adverse personnel  decisions  about  people
associated  with  the left.  I  do  not  believe  that  a similarly  long  list  could  be  compiled  of people
associated  with the right who suffered  adverse personnel  decisions.
95.  Part of the reason for the concern about deviations from conservatism may be peculiar to law
schools.  Most law students  come into law school as naive positivists, and many end that way.  They
believe that whatever  the courts and legislature articulate as the law must for that reason be correct,
and anyone who criticizes  the present state of the law must be doing so for merely  political reasons.
Because  the current  Supreme Court is conservative, naive positivism makes students  exercised about
deviations  from conservatism.
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that  in this form  the  difficulties  present  only  a pedagogic  problem--or
opportunity, if one is optimistic.  Few instructors are likely to get across
the  mine  field  unscathed,  though:  student  visits  to  the associate  dean,
letters to the  student  newspaper,  public  letters,  and  the  like may  well
occur.  To the extent that these actions make a teacher's  life more diffi-
cult, as Macneil's account shows they do, they impair the teacher's abil-
ity  to teach.
Note, however, that the threat to effective pedagogy, at least in consti-
tutional  law,  comes  from both,  or  all,  sides  of the  political  spectrum.
That  is why,  in my  view,  the real  problem cannot be attributed to par-
tisans of particular political viewpoints.  It must be found in the ordinary
operation of universities as institutions.
B.  Orthodoxy in Institutional  Self-Definition
The problem must be narrowed  even more,  for there are situations in
which even a secular college or department might properly enforce a cer-
tain kind of orthodoxy.96  Some political science departments, for exam-
ple, are Straussian.  They find it easy to hire someone who can refer in an
off-handed footnote to "the  less thoughtful egalitarianism  and socialism
of Eastern  academe  as  expressed  in  the  works  of men  like  Professors
Robert  Nozick, John  Rawls, and  Michael  Walzer,"97  a  statement that,
despite  its charming  loopiness,  would  be  disqualifying in  other depart-
ments.  An economics department  striving to gain a national reputation
might notice that there is an open niche in the market for a department
that  concentrates  in  blending  Austrian  and  Marxist  economics,  and
might deliberately  refuse  to hire superbly qualified  neo-classicists.
Everyone involved in academic hiring knows that faculties make deci-
sions like these all the time, at least in the sense that these factors influ-
ence choice on the margin (which, as I noted  earlier, is where  all choice
occurs).  No  decent  theory  of academic  freedom  could  condemn  such
decisions,  even  though in an important  sense people are  denied jobs on
political  or  ideological  grounds.98  Judith Jarvis  Thomson  has  argued
96.  I put aside the special questions raised by church-related  institutions that impose a religious
orthodoxy,  which  may also be  political  in some of its dimensions, on  students and  faculty.  For a
slightly out-of-focus discussion, see Michael W. McConnell, Academic Freedom in Religious Colleges
and Universities, 53 LAW  & CONTEMP. PROBS.  303 (Summer  1990).  The discussion  is out-of-focus
because  it  is  structured  as  a  criticism  of  the  position  taken  by  the  American  Association  of
University  Professors, that institutions which restrict academic freedom  in certain ways ought not be
entitled to claim  that they are  real colleges.  To  which the proper response ought  to be,  So what?
McConnell  does  explain,  however, the  values  served  by  allowing  religious  institutions  to  impose
orthodoxy on students and faculty, which is different from explaining why such institutions ought to
be called  colleges and universities.
97.  Broyles,  Partisans of Federalism, in  E  PLURIBUS  UNUM:  CONSTITUTIONAL  PRINCIPLES
AND  THE INSTITUTIONS  OF  GOVERNMENT  261 n.29  (Sarah  B.  Thurow  ed.,  1988).
98.  I  distinguish  the  two,  although  in  many  cases  there  is  such  a  high  correlation  between
ideology and  politics-there are,  I think, almost no Straussians  located on  the traditional  left-wing
(although  some  Straussians  define  others,  who are  insufficiently  conservative,  as  left-wing)-that
1992]
29
Tushnet: Political Correctness, the Law, and the Legal Academy
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1992Yale  Journal  of Law  & the Humanities
that the theory of academic  freedom should permit these decisions when
they result from  good faith  consideration  of professionally  relevant  fac-
tors, such as institutional need and mission.99  The difficulty, of course, is
that  all  parts  of the  political spectrum  sometimes  try to  enforce  their
views without the  requisite good  faith.
Once  we  see that the problem  is bad faith,  though, its contours  shift.
For, though it is easy to see how small groups or departments might act
in bad faith, it is harder to understand how it comes about that the col-
lege or university  as a whole  stands back and lets that bad  faith action
take effect.  To do  so, we have to consider how universities operate.
C.  Administrators  as Bureaucrats  and Crisis  Managers
Macneil  found the "administration  and faculty response"  to his situa-
tion "of particular  interest."  Faculty colleagues  "made  private support-
ive comments."  An  administrator "offered  administration  'help'  several
times-surely  in an effort to smooth the  waters rather than  to  face the
issues."  The  administration,  that is,  did  not  affirmatively  do anything
wrong. In  Macneil's  view, what was wrong was  that the administration
did  not do anything  to "recognize[  ] publicly  the  dangers  to academic
freedom of the politicized  classroom that the Women's  Law Association
seeks to impose on faculty and students alike."'"
The theme of administrative inaction in the face of threats to academic
freedom  is pervasive.  An example  from  the other  side of the political
spectrum is instructive.  Professor Sally Sedgwick of the Dartmouth phi-
losophy department  was the object of a scurrilous campaign against her
by the Dartmouth  Review.  The Review mobilized supporters outside the
college  to  place  pressure  on  Sedgwick  and  the  college,  erroneously
reporting that she had accused a member of the Review's staff of plagia-
rism because  he disagreed  with her political  positions."°'  According  to
Andrew  Bowers,  who  reported  the  story,  "throughout"  the  period,
"Sedgwick  waited for Dartmouth President James 0.  Freedman to speak
out  on  her  behalf.  Instead,  his  office  sent  the  professor  a  bunch  of
roses....  Privately, the administration was telling her that she had acted
properly.  Publicly,  it  made  no  such  statement."  The  episode  ended
when the administration reduced the sanction imposed on the student for
inadequately  footnoting his research  paper from  a two-term  suspension
to a one-term suspension; the student agreed not to sue the college.  "An
administration source said that Dartmouth had acted out of compassion"
faculties  might  well  be  skeptical  about  the  ideological  credentials  of  a candidate  who  held  the
"wrong"  political  views.
99.  Judith Jarvis  Thomson, Ideology and Faculty Selection,  53  LAW & CONTEMP.  PROBs.  155
(Summer  1990).
100.  Macneil,  supra note  18,  at  11.
101.  For what  appears  to  be  a  full  account,  see  Andrew  Bowers,  Politics and Pedagogy at
Dartmouth, LINGUA  FRANCA,  Feb.  1991,  at 22.
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to alleviate the  strain on the student.  "Sedgwick,  for her part, wonders
how much concern there was for her."  Finally, "three months after the
affair began,"  the  dean  of faculty  distributed  a  statement  saying  that
Sedgwick  "did  exactly  what  she should have  done,"  but  tempered  that
statement by expressing concern about the faculty's  rules regarding  pla-
giarism and failure  to footnote adequately.
The  Sedgwick incident has most of the characteristics  of the political
correctness  problem  even  though  it  involves  a  right-wing  attack.  The
difficulty is not that university administrations  fail, in the end, to do the
right thing;  rather, the difficulty  is that it takes  them too long to do it,
and even  then their response  is often  qualified by inappropriate  conces-
sions to ideologues."°2  That, in my view,  is the real political correctness
problem." 03  Why  does it happen?
The usual  story is embodied in  the title of Roger  Kimball's  Tenured
Radicals.  1   The most active members of today's faculties were, as I was,
students in  the  1960s and, the story  goes,  continue  to hold the  radical
values  we adopted  then.  Now, having  access  to institutional  power  as
faculty members, we enforce political correctness.  Yet, if the problem  is
administrative inaction, that story cannot be correct.  For, even if we are
now influential members of the faculty, we are not administrators: James
Freedman  was not  a student radical; when  Harvard's alumni  magazine
proffled the university's new president, its story opened with an anecdote
showing  how  "responsibly"  he had behaved during  the student  turmoil
of the  1960s;105  and Robert Clark, dean of Harvard  Law School during
the Macneil incident,  is well-known  for being unsympathetic  personally
to the left.' °6
Administrators are slow to act, then, not because they agree with the
attacks  on  faculty  members  or  students.107  They  are  slow,  in  part,
because they  are bureaucrats,  who  follow  the rules no matter what the
circumstances.  They  also follow  the  rules  in  part  out  of deference  to
102.  The Macneil  incident  is different  in form (and,  I have argued, in substance as well, to the
extent  that  the  HWLA  letter  was  not  aimed  at  "politicizing  the  classroom"  but  was  aimed  at
Macneil's inappropriate pedagogy).  Because Macneil was a visiting professor, a delayed response by
the  administration  amounted  to no  response  at  all,  which  is  probably  what  the  administration
wanted  in the first place,  for reasons discussed  in text  accompanying  notes  111-12  infra.
103.  For  a  similar  perspective,  offered  in  the  heightened  tone  of his  polemical  writings,  see
Genovese, supra note  53.
104.  ROGER  KIMBALL, TENURED  RADICALS:  How  POLrICS  HAS  CORRUPTED  OUR  HIGHER
EDUCATION  (1990).
105.  Lambert,  Renaissance President, HARVARD  MAGAZINE,  May-June  1991,  at  31.
106.  I  am  reasonably  confident  that, given  complete  freedom  to take sides,  Freedman  would
have agreed  with Sedgwick  on the  merits.  I am  less confident  that, given  similar  freedom,  Clark
would have  sided with Macneil,  because, as  I have argued,  Macneil's defense of his actions  on the
merits  was  not  persuasive  (and  because  I  believe  that  Clark's  position  would  be  determined
substantially  by his assessment  of the merits).
107.  The analysis in the remainder  of this  section has a more speculative aspect  than what has
gone  before,  in  large  measure  because,  although  I  am  a  faculty  member  and  have,  I  believe,  a
reasonably good sense of faculty culture, I am not an administrator and am less confident about  my
sense  of that culture.
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faculty  autonomy.  For example,  when the Bennington  English depart-
ment acted inappropriately in refusing to renew Edward Hoagland's con-
tract,"'8  the college's  president did not  simply jump in  and reverse the
decision;  she referred  it to the campus academic  freedom  committee for
investigation and report.  When events are unambiguous, perhaps admin-
istrators ought to forgo the ordinary mechanisms of review.  But, unhap-
pily,  events  are  rarely  unambiguous  except  to  the  victims  and  their
tormentors.  In  a world filled  with  ambiguity,  we  have  to worry about
authorizing  administrators  to  iritervene  promptly  when  they  conclude
that  events  were  unambiguous;  sometimes  they  will  find  things  clear
when they were  actually unclear, and the campus climate might then be
even chillier than it is when  administrators  always wait for the routine
mechanisms of review to kick in.
That is the generous account of what happens to slow down the public
presentation  of  the  right  response  to  student  or  faculty  misbehavior.
Bureaucracy,  though,  can  cause  another  kind  of problem.  University
administrators  delegate  a  lot of their functions to  units  like  affirmative
action  offices,  which  take  their  specialized  missions  single-mindedly.
Consider  what  happens  when  a  hate-speech  regulation  is  proposed.
Because such regulations  are generated at least in part by pressure from
minority students and  faculty  and their sympathizers,  an administrator
might well assign the job of developing the regulations, or writing a pam-
phlet explaining  them,  to the affirmative  action  office.  That  guarantees
trouble.  The affirmative  action office  will try to extend  the reach of the
regulations  as far  as  it can,  disregarding  any  contrary  free  expression
concerns." 9  Nor can  central offices like the chancellor's or provost's be
counted  on to tone down  the  regulations.  They may not pay  attention
carefully enough.  More important, though, what the separate specialized
offices develop can be melded into a coherent educational  program only if
the chancellor,  provost,  or  president  actually  has such  a  program,  or
thinks it a good thing to try to develop one.  That, however, is precisely
what administrators  who see their jobs as merely political  lack.
As this  analysis suggests, though bureaucracy  is certainly  part of the
story, there  is much  more.  For, university  administrators  are not  only
bureaucrats; they are crisis managers as well.  Today's administrators are
indeed children of the  1960s, but they were not the radicals  on campus;
they were  the  centrists.  They  learned  their lessons  about politics  from
John  Kennedy and their lessons about universities from  Clark Kerr, the
former president of the University of California  who  clearly articulated
108.  See  text  accompanying  notes  10-14 supra.
109.  That  appears  to  have  been  what  happened  at  the  University  of  Michigan,  where  the
affirmative action office wrote a set of explanations of the hate-speech  regulations that extended their
reach in a grossly excessive  manner.  See  Doe v. Univ.  of Michigan,  721 F. Supp.  852 (E.D. Mich.
1989).
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the view that the modem university was simply a political enterprise and
then failed  as  a politician."'  Seeing  the university as  a political  enter-
prise, administrators see their job as accommodating  the conflicting pres-
sures  they  feel  from all  sorts  of constituencies,  inside  and outside  the
university.  The best of them hope that, once all the pressures are diffused
and  set  against  each  other,  they  will  have  some  freedom  to  move the
university  in  some particular  direction.  But,  they tend  to  believe  that
their  freedom  is  quite  constrained,  and  that  most  of  what  they  do
involves  keeping  the university  on course,  not developing  some distinc-
tive educational mission.
How, then, do politicians and crisis managers respond to political cor-
rectness  problems?  First, they  move  slowly.  Macneil  found  that  the
HWLA  letter absorbed an "incredible  amount of [his]  time and psychic
energy."1 1'  But, while the events  were  surely the most important  thing
happening  to  him  at the  time,  they  almost  certainly  were  much  less
important to the administration.  Macneil was going to leave Harvard  in
a few  months anyway,  and  the  administration  could  reasonably  expect
that most people  would have forgotten the  events by the fall.
Strikingly, administrators have-reason to delay even when the charges
are frivolous.  They know that, in the main, precisely because the charges
are frivolous,  at  the end of the day nothing  is going  to  come of them.
When students bring the charges, administrators  know that the students
will graduate,  or  will  find another  atrocity  to protest  next  semester." 2
As politicians,  administrators  find it senseless  to buy trouble  today  by
trying to explain in the heat of controversy that one side was clearly right
and the other clearly wrong, when they know  that tomorrow or-as in
Sedgwick's  case-three  months  later  the  explanation  will  go  down
smoothly.
After delay, the administrator's second response is compromise.  Fac-
ing  diverse pressures  from students, alumni, politicians,  the media,  fed-
eral bureaucrats, and  many  others, administrators  believe that the  most
sensible short-term  strategy is to buy off as many pressures as they can.
If  they  can  give  in  to  one  constituency  without  seriously  offending
another, they will.  When students criticize a professor, the easiest course
for the administrator is to do nothing.  The students publish the student
newspaper;  the  professor  has  many  fewer  resources  to make  political
trouble for the  administration.
The managerial  mind-set originated in what was perceived  as a trans-
formation  in the  university's  role  in  the years  after  1945.  The  radical
110.  See  CLARK  KERR,  THE USES  OF  THE  UNIVERSITY  (1963).  For a  discussion  of  Kerr's
failure  at  the managerial  task,  see  W.J.  RORBAUGH,  BERKELEY  AT  WAR:  THE  1960s,  at  10-40
(1989).
111.  Macneil, supra note  18,  at  10.
112.  The Sedgwick  incident  is  different  precisely  because  the Dartmouth Review's successful
efforts  at mobilizing  outside support mean that  the episode  is much  less likely to blow  over.
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students  of  the  1960s  argued  that  the  multiversity  had  become
politicized.  As they saw it, universities  had abandoned their mission of
disinterested truth-seeking  to serve the immediate  interests  of the polit-
ical  interest  groups  of the larger  society. 113  The  argument  then  devel-
oped  in  two  divergent  directions.  First,  a  Marxist-influenced  strand,
confident  that  the  disinterested  pursuit  of  truth  would  liberate  the
oppressed,  tried  to  restore  what it  presented  as  the  university's  tradi-
tional mission, that is, to "de-politicize"  it.  Second,  a strand that I asso-
ciate with populism and progressivism tried to shift the political direction
of the university, to "re-politicize"  it in the  correct way.
114
Neither direction  proved terribly effective, but the restorationist  effort
failed sooner  and  more  dramatically." 5  The restorationists  were  com-
mitted to acknowledging  the possibility that people  they disagreed with
politically might still have found out something true; their mind-set, that
is,  was  incompatible  with  the  oppositionist  tenor of  much  radicalism.
Further, the restorationists faced a difficult rhetorical task.  They had to
show that some of their opponents were falsely claiming to be engaged in
the disinterested pursuit of truth when they really were pursuing a polit-
ical agenda.  By engaging  in such an argument, the restorationists had a
"baseline"  problem;  the  argument  was  over  where  to  find  the proper
baseline  of the disinterested  pursuit  of truth,  and  such  arguments  are
notoriously difficult to win.  The people they opposed claimed to be pur-
suing truth while, as they put it, the restorationists  were trying to politi-
cize  the  university.  This  problem  was  exacerbated  by  the  Marxist
element in the restorationist camp, because, in the political culture of the
United States, to say that someone is a Marxist is precisely to say that he
or she  is not interested  in the pursuit of truth.
The  populist-progressive  camp,  in  contrast,  had  a  somewhat  easier
time.  As Marxism  was discredited,  that camp offered  the only  alterna-
tive  to  what  all on  the  left  agreed  was  a  university  politicized  in  the
wrong  way.  Also, it was able to ride post-Marxist currents of European
social  thought that argued that all scholarship  was political.  These cur-
rents  made  it  possible  for  "re-politicizers"  to  ignore  their  opponents'
scholarship,  but,  more  important,  they  also  displaced  the  argument
113.  The language of "abandonment"  suggests that universities  once had, but recently  lost, the
disinterested  mission.  Some  radical  students  did not make  that historical  claim,  but argued  that
universities,  whatever  they had been and  were, ought  to pursue truth disinterestedly.
114.  I  am  unaware of a comprehensive history of these developments.  PETER NovicK,  THAT
NOBLE  DREAM:  THE "OBjECrIVITY" QUESTION  AND  THE  AMERICAN  HISTORICAL PROFESSION
(1988),  provides  essential background, but as it reaches  the  1960s its analysis becomes  increasingly
sketchy.
115.  I  think  it important  to note  that, in history,  the field  with which I am  most familiar,  the
Marxist-influenced  restorationists,  Eugene  Genovese  and  Sean  Wilentz,  are  among  the  most
important and  productive scholars,  which makes  the attack on  "political  correctness"  particularly
misplaced.  These scholars would be happy to see the university taken out of politics; some, however,
believe that it is  already  so  deeply  implicated  in politics  that a determined  attack  on the political
character of the university  is  essential.
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entirely.  If all  scholarship  was  political,  it could  not  be  a criticism  of
their work--or of anyone's-that it was not neutral  or apolitical.
In its best form, represented  for example  by Stanley Fish, this line of
argument  leads  to  genial  tolerance  of the  tolerant.  The  only  point  it
needs to make is that adherents  of traditional scholarship ought not rule
new  forms  of scholarship out of bounds by  arguing that proponents  of
the new forms are trying to "politicize"  the university.  On populist-pro-
gressive  argument, the  university  is  always  already  politicized,  and  the
populist-progressive  camp is simply trying to  get in the door.
At this point, the interests  of the "re-politicizers"  and administrators
as managers  came into  line.  Not  that administrators  welcomed  the re-
politicizers, who, after all, did disrupt systems of administrative behavior
that  had  settled  into  place.  Rather,  the  re-politicizers  were  people
administrators  could  deal  with,  as  the  restorationists  were  not.  The
restorationists  rejected  the  administrators'  characteristic  way of think-
ing---compromise and balance-in favor of a vision of the university as a
place where disinterested scholars pursued the truth.  The re-politicizers,
in contrast,  simply  wanted to bargain  with everyone  else  over  dividing
the university's goods.  And, for a while, they did reasonably well in the
bargaining process.
Yet,  the strategies  of delay  and compromise,  though  sensible  in  the
short run, can cause trouble in the long run.  Other constituencies, par-
ticularly those outside the university,  can start to bring pressure on the
administration.  Indeed, seen politically, that is precisely what the attack
on political correctness  is: the mobilization of outside forces to put polit-
ical pressure on university administrations."  I6  It seems significant in this
connection that Benno  Schmidt, the president of Yale University  and a
man of the liberal-left, responded to the political correctness controversy
by  calling  the  criticisms  "substantial.""' 7  If I  were  Dinesh  D'Souza,
though,  I  would  not  wait  a  long  time  hoping  to  notice  differences  in
Yale's behavior." 8
Schmidt's  statement, indeed,  may  be  typical.  Sophisticated  adminis-
trators, those  who become  presidents  of major  universities,  give  half a
loaf to  each  side.  Instead  of changing  policies,  they  issue  statements.
And, in doing so,  they  point out to both sides that, if they continue  to
complain, the other side will get even  more upset.  And, when that hap-
116.  For  an  articulate  presentation  of this  point,  see  the  remarks  of Stanley  Fish  on  the
MacNeil/Lehrer  Newshour, (PBS television  broadcast,  June  19,  1991)  (Transcript  #4058  available
on  NEXIS).
117.  Yale Chief  Decries 'Politically  Correct'Limits  on Speech, CHI.  TRIB.,  June 6,  1991,  at A28.
118.  Yale, though, may present a special case, because Donald Kagan, dean of Yale College, has
been a prominent supporter of the political correctness attack.  See, e.g.,  MacNeil/Lehrer  Newshour,
(PBS  television broadcast,  June  20,  1991)  (Transcript  #4059  available on  NEXIS).  But see Alex
Beam,  The Fall of Yale's Poster Child, BOSTON  GLOBE,  Oct.  10,  1991,  at A17 (reporting  "depth of
anti-Kagan  feelings"  at  faculty meeting).
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pens,  the  implicit  threat  is,  the  university  will  have  to respond  to the
greater pressure,  which will make the complainers worse  off than ever.
V.  CONCLUSION
Critics  of political  correctness  believe  that  universities  have  become
politicized.  Ordinarily, that means that universities  are bastions of lib-
eral orthodoxy.  There is a small grain of truth to that.  Conservatism has
prevailed in virtually all the society's major institutions, but it has not yet
taken over the universities.  To suggest that the remedy for "politicizing"
the  universities  is  to  politicize  them  differently,  though,  is  a  little
peculiar.
The political  correctness  controversy  ironically  confirms  the  analysis
students  offered  in  the  1960s.  Political  correctness  problems  arise
because university administrators have no real sense of what their institu-
tions ought to be  doing, aside from accommodating  political  pressures.
And,  the  political  correctness  controversy  itself  became  just  another
source of political trouble for university administrators, something to be
"handled."
Under these circumstances,  it seems almost fruitless for a non-admin-
istrator to advance a vision of "the university";  what I have to say, as a
member  of a  faculty,  will  inevitably  be  taken by  those  in positions  of
power merely as another claim by a member of a pressure group.  And,
in light of what I have already  said, what I can contribute to developing a
vision of "the  university"  is quite limited in any event.  For, when  all is
said and done, what we need are administrators who have a vision of the
university-any  vision at all.119
I  have  argued  that  there  are  two  dimensions  on  which  universities
ought to take a position:  the degree to which  they take  their mission  to
include the moral formation  of their students,  and the degree to which
they are committed to the pursuit of disinterested  scholarship (acknowl-
edging that today the idea that scholarship  can  be disinterested is itself
contested).  In  a  society  with  many,  potentially  diverse  institutions  of
higher education,  what  we need  are universities that forthrightly take a
position along these dimensions.  Some could decide to take an extremely
active  role  in  moral  formation;  they  might then  adopt  stringent  "hate
speech"  codes.  Others could  decide  to leave moral  formation  to other
119.  The  examples  come  to  mind  of  institutions  whose  administrators  do  have  a  vision-
Hillsdale College on the right,  New College of Law  on the left-are small ones.  Perhaps the large
multiversities are so far removed from being able to fulfill the classical  ideal of the university that we
cannot expect  more  vision  from  their managers.  A university  manager  who tried  to implement a
vision  might  bring the university to a halt.  Yet,  if that is  true, I wonder  what the premise  of the
attack  on  "political  correctness"  could  possibly  be;  certainly,  on  this  assumption,  one could  not
reasonably expect  a university  administrator to try to restore  the university to its pre-multiversity
state.  If the major  Catholic  universities  like Georgetown  ever make the transition  to multiversity
status,  it will be interesting  to see how they handle  the issue of maintaing their  distinctive religious
commitment.
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institutions;  they might  then treat their campuses as free fire free speech
zones.  What matters, though, is that, once the institutions have taken a
position,  they  defend  it  vigorously  and  without  embarrassment  as
embodying  a  permissible  vision  of  the  university  in  contemporary
society. 12 0
This course  is unlikely to be easy.  Opportunists and careerists  within
and outside the university, and ignoramuses on the right and the left, will
surely attack  any institution that takes a position with which they disa-
gree.  And,  as  we  have  seen,  precisely  because  many  positions  on  the
issues  of moral  formation  and disinterested  scholarship  are  defensible,
these  attacks can be formulated in intellectually  respectable  terms.  The
correct  response to them, though, should  be, "If you don't like the way
we  do things  here, go somewhere  else."
Despite  some hopeful  statements,' 2I I find little  in the discussions  of
political correctness  to suggest that the controversy's outcome  will be a
new  commitment  within  the  university  to  the  disinterested  pursuit  of
truth.  The issue has been hijacked  by a particular political tendency, and
there is little reason to believe that many people on either the left or the
right will find  it profitable  to try to rescue  it.
In  writing  this  essay  I  have  been  reminded  of Joseph  Haennig,  a
French  lawyer  who  wrote  an  article  during  the Vichy  regime  arguing
that Nazi  statutes  defining  who  was a Jew  ought to be  construed nar-
rowly.' 22  Richard  Weisberg,  who  brought  Haennig  to  our  attention,
notes the moral dilemma he was in.  To argue that the statutes should be
construed narrowly  might save the lives and property  of some Jews.  To
argue about how the statutes should be construed, though, was to partici-
pate in a vicious system, if only as a matter of necessity.  So too, I have
felt,  about  participating  in the  discussion  of political  correctness.  Not
that the critics of "political  correctness" are in the same moral category
as Henri Petain, but they have structured a discussion  on premises that
are so removed from moral and empirical reality that it is problematic  to
engage in the discussion  at all.123
120.  I would make the same argument about the disinterested pursuit of scholarship: universities
should determine  their position on the contested question of whether such a pursuit is possible, and
then  develop  personnel and other  policies compatible  with that position.
121.  See especially Genovese,  supra note 53.
122.  See  R.WEISBERG,  THE  FAILURE  OF  THE  WORD:  THE  PROTAGONIST  AS  LAWYER  IN
MODERN  FIcTIoN,  1 (1984).
123.  And,  I think, with  less justification than Haennig,  who, if he was to act as a lawyer at all,
had  to act within  the system  as it was (and who may have  been trying to save lives).
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